Policy 360: The South China Sea
Launched in March 2021, Policy 360 is a new initiative by Columbia Political Review that aims to assess policies from around the world on similar political issues. Its goal is to highlight and provoke critical discussions through an international lens, broadening American-centric perspectives on pertinent political issues. This is the third piece of an ongoing series.
Events in the South China Sea maintain an enduring presence in world news, as numerous countries compete and utilize the region for a variety of political, economic, and military pursuits. The Sea’s geo-strategic importance cannot be understated; a third of the world’s trade passes through it annually, and it holds tremendous amounts of natural resources. For these reasons, regional and international state actors alike remain invested and in contention with one another over the vast territory.
This piece focuses on the varied strategic perspectives of nations with significant interest in the South China Sea. Territorial disputes arise from conflicting claims, some based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and others on historical holdings. While major regional powers like China and Vietnam challenge one another across the Sea, Western nations like the United States, France, and Australia likewise strive to assert their interpretations of international law there. Amongst these traditional Western allies, however, there is also tension and intense disagreement over policy. The AUKUS deal that provides Australia with nuclear submarines from the U.S. and U.K. has stirred up conflict with France, which previously had an agreement to provide such vessels to Australia. This recent development has complicated the South China Sea dispute even further.
This roundtable seeks to underscore the complexities of competition in the South China Sea by analyzing the region from the viewpoints of such major actors. Each section concludes with a series of policy recommendations and assessments of what the nation’s future actions may entail. However, amid growing contention and constant military movements, it must be noted that these suggestions are subject to evolution, much in the same way that the region’s political situation is. With tensions between the U.S. and China rising, and the West’s relationships under strain, the lasting economic and political impacts of each nation’s actions remain to be seen.
China’s Power Grab for Regional Hegemony: Military Aggression in the South China Sea and Implications of a Brewing Conflict
By Melissa Yu, Columbia College ‘25
The South China Sea, spanning 3.5 million square kilometers, is home to many vital shipping ports, and has an estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas within its small islands and reefs. Because of its prime geo-strategic location and vast untapped natural resources, contention between countries who each hold their own territorial claims over the land, including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Taiwan, has resulted in one of today's most complicated international political disputes. China claims the largest portion of the territory defined as the "nine-dash line", citing maritime records from dynastic times to claim around 90% of the area. Even after the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a decision in 2016 rejecting China’s territorial claims, China dismissed the ruling and further displayed its military ambitions, partly because of the Court’s lack of enforcement power and regional countries’ military inferiority and entangled economic interests with China.
In recent years, China has increased its efforts to reclaim land in the South China Sea through the exponential creation of ports, military installations, and airstrips, especially in the Paracel and Spratly islands, where there are a combined 27 outposts. Additionally, the Mischief Reef off the shores of the Philippines and six other nearby reefs have been converted into Chinese military bases. China also maintains that under international law, foreign militaries do not have the right to conduct intelligence-gathering activities in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which has been heavily disputed by many countries including the United States. The failure of Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders to resolve the South China Sea dispute by diplomatic means is increasingly dangerous to the preservation of international laws that govern maritime disputes, and risks military escalation.
However, it is clear that China will not back down from exercising its military and economic dominance in the region as it has not only disregarded international law, but also expanded the application of its domestic laws internationally. In February 2021, China passed its new Coast Guard Law, which allows the Chinese coast guard to fire on foreign vessels that enter China’s waters, including the “nine-dash line,” without permission. This law has serious implications on surrounding nations, which are simply too weak to contest China without the support of other nations like the US. The legal dispute reveals the real reason why China has such an aggressive territorial stance on the South China Sea, beyond ancient territorial claims: hegemony. Whoever gains control of the South China Sea has a prime location for military bases and submarines, vital trading routes, and natural resources. Ultimately, the South China Sea is key to China’s attempt to maintain political, economical, and geo-strategic dominance in the region.
What has made China’s actions possible thus far is other countries' anxieties over potential conflicts, resulting in over 70+ countries publicly supporting China’s position in the South China Sea. However, recent tensions show otherwise: alliances such as the AUKUS pact between the U.S., Australia, and the U.K. threaten to counter China’s aggressive pursuit of the South China Sea. Thus, China should cooperate with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and other countries with stakes in the South China Sea in order to dispel heightening political tensions and maintain peace in the region.
Countering China: United States Foreign Policy in the South China Sea and Lessons from the Cold War Playbook
By Carsten Barnes, School of General Studies ’23
The United States has played an important role in the South China Sea dispute over the last decade, principally as the chief antagonist to China’s expansive claims in the region. Over the last several years in particular, U.S.-China relations have deteriorated and the South China Sea dispute emerged as a key flashpoint between the two countries amid a backdrop of trade disputes and increasing American concern about the “rising power” of China.
What makes the dispute particularly important for the United States has been China’s insistence that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives China the right to regulate foreign military activity in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This interpretation would give China free reign to dominate the sea and put it in a good position to emerge as a regional hegemonic power, a development which the United States has long wished to avoid.
The dispute became a significant part of U.S. foreign policy in 2013 when China began constructing military outposts and creating artificial islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea. In response to these developments, the United States has increased military cooperation with several of the competing claimants in the South China Sea, including Vietnam and the Philippines, holding joint military exercises and conducting joint naval patrols. The keystone of the U.S. response has been the conduction of Freedom of Navigation operations wherein the U.S. navy sails through the disputed waters to reinforce the U.S. commitment to UNCLOS, only allowing a country to regulate economic activity—not foreign military activity—in its EEZ.
However, these policies seem to have had limited effectiveness, as they have not prevented China from continuing its aggressive policies in the South China Sea, and in the long run, repeatedly sending naval patrols into an area where China has a significant military presence could compromise America’s military defense systems.
Instead of relying on its military prowess, the United States must take a page out of its successful Cold War strategy book. It is vital that it focuses first on building a system of alliances in the region with countries whose interests are threatened by China and who share America’s democratic values. Specifically, the United States should focus its efforts on strengthening and formalizing the Quad Alliance between itself, Japan, India, and Australia. Each of these countries are democracies and have considerable economic and/or military power, and all three have had their interests threatened by China in recent years.
The South China Sea dispute is a problem that will only grow for the United States, as China is currently in the process of massively expanding its military, and its economy is on track to exceed that of the United States by the early 2030s. In response, the United States should focus on building alliances, as alliances act as a force multiplier and are the only way to prepare for the moment when China becomes a larger economic power and comes closer to military parity with the United States.
Walking a Thin Line: Vietnam’s Strive for Defense Capabilities and Economic Interests
By Claire Schnatterbeck, Columbia College ’24
On August 25, 2021, United States Vice President Kamala Harris made a historic visit to Vietnam, becoming the first U.S. V.P. to visit the country. During a speech with Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc in the capital city of Hanoi, Vice President Harris called on Vietnam to back the United States against China’s maritime claims to the South China Sea.
Vice President Harris’s visit is significant after the announcement of the AUKUS pact, because Vietnam currently makes claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. China’s claims overlap with Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, an important trade route in the South China Sea, where Vietnam has an annual $158 billion worth of exports, or 5% of the 3.37 trillions of global trade through the South China Sea.
Vietnam has been critical of Chinese claims in the region over the past few years, moving to increase its defense forces within the South China Sea. Such defense improvements include expanding its fishing militia in the region and signing a deal with Japan to enable Japanese-made defense equipment to be exported into the country. Vietnam is just one of eleven countries to sign this type of agreement with Japan during this period of tensions in the South China Sea. Vietnam is also a key member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an intergovernmental organization of ten Southeast Asian countries that seeks to promote economic, political, and security cooperation. The bloc has had difficulty developing a unified counter to China’s actions in the South China Sea, which is significant because several of its members also have claims to the region.
While Vietnam has not commented on its partnership with the United States, Vietnamese spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang affirmed in September that Vietnam believes “all countries strive for the same goal of peace, stability, cooperation and development in the region and the world over.” Vietnam appears to be walking the line between maintaining cultural and economic relations with China—which would be advantageous to its national interest—and asserting its defense capabilities.
As the situation progresses, members of ASEAN and other countries in the region will be looking to Vietnam. However, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, Vietnam’s leaders have more incentive to align themselves with the Americans. During her speech, Vice President Harris announced that the U.S. will donate one million more doses of Pfizer’s COVID vaccine to Vietnam, on top of an initial donation of six million doses. Harris is also launching the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s new Southeast Asia regional office in the city of Hanoi. Moreover, aside from celebrating 25 years of diplomatic relations last year, the U.S. has also become Vietnam’s second largest trading partner and exporter. To ensure Vietnam’s continued health and security, it would be advantageous for it to align with the U.S. following the AUKUS pact, which may explain the spate of its recent foreign policy decisions.
AUKUS Pact Paves Way for Australia’s New Multilateral Role in the South China Sea
By Michelle Brucker, School of General Studies ’23
The last time the United States provided nuclear-propelled submarines to a non-nuclear country like Australia was in 1958. The Five Eyes Alliance, the Quad-Plus, and a $66 billion deal with the French did not bring such material advantage to Australia. AUKUS, however, presents artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum computing, and nuclear-propelled submarines as alternative gains. Although the Australian government was notified in 2016 that nuclear technologies were viable given the country’s large supply of uranium, it still needs about 10 years to install the submarines that it received from the United States. Still, AUKUS marks a new era of trilateral cooperation in expanding the bilateral nuclear partnership between the U.K. and U.S., and engaging Australia in a greater military and defense interface. Throughout this process, Australia will be held accountable for abiding by provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and for proving its compliance to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, Australia will need to hold its new strategic partner accountable for sustaining cooperative efforts, where the future of technological development will be a significant measure of AUKUS’ success.
Recently, Australia has assumed a more prominent role in the development of technologies which can deter Chinese strategic interests in the South Pacific. Nonetheless, its security officials have reported themselves that its advancements in defense were well behind those of China at large. Still, the Australian government views its partnership with the U.S. as a strategic alliance with the capacity to last long term. Australia will inevitably take note of its long-standing economic engagements with China. Currently, trade with China accounts for over 30% of Australia’s total trade. Experts have also noted that the submarines may not provide qualified strategic authority, as its command of such machinery might prove more limited than that of the UK or the US. Still, the capacity for these submarines to remain in the water for longer lengths of time will be crucial for monitoring apprehensive Chinese activity throughout the Sea.
One also cannot deny the fact that Australia and the U.S. share a strategic partnership in missile technology. In 2014, the Chinese-Australian ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ set forth different ambitions to the state’s position against Chinese military expansion in the South China Sea. Whether AUKUS marks an enduring modification of Australian strategic interests or not, the future of Australia’s role will depend upon Australian initiatives and U.S. commitments to growing ingenuity in the field of defense and nuclear technology. Australia’s intentions seem clear enough: it has both the capacity and desire to develop its strength throughout the area. Whether it wishes for the international community to acknowledge its commitment to defending America’s role in this new “Cold War” or not, it has clearly promoted defensive protection of its own territory. This partnership presents Australia with a multilateral role it has not assumed before, maximizing its capacity to bolster defense through developing tools of deterrence against potential Chinese aggression.
Betrayed and Pulled by Competing Interests: France Navigates Disputes in the South China Sea with Heightened Distrust and Cautious Passivity
By Zadig Perrot, School of General Studies ’22
France was quick to show its ire over the formation of AUKUS and the American co-optation of the Australian nuclear submarine deal. The announcements were made only a few hours before Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, was set to announce the European Union (E.U.)’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The strategy is a multidimensional plan that proposes the multiplication of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and the strengthening of the E.U. Common Security and Defense Policy through further cooperation with local players. Outrage was so great that it led French Foreign Minister Jean Yves le Drian to call it a “stab in the back,” declaring that when it came to Australia, the “trust was betrayed.”
It is a major reality check for a country that wishes to position itself as a significant military actor in the region, notably due to its overseas territories in the Pacific: Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and New Caledonia. France was the first E.U. country to adopt an official Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, before Paris convinced other member states that an E.U.-level coordinated approach was necessary. A 2019 report from the defense ministry revealed that more than 1.6 million French citizens lived in the region
The blow was particularly bitter due to France’s intermittent naval presence in the South China Sea as the country contests the legality of Chinese territorial claims. France’s presence had already provoked Beijing’s anger in 2019, calling it an “illegal” violation of national maritime “sovereignty.” On February 8, 2021, the minister of the Army Florence Parly revealed that the nuclear submarine SNA Emeraude, along with another support vessel, had been deployed in the South China Sea to show France’s support for its Australian, American, and Japanese partners. Later this year, France also partook in a joint military exercise with the U.S. and Japan, simulating the defense of remote islands and the interception of enemy vessels.
This heightened presence is consistent with former defense minister Le Drian’s promise to sail through the South China Sea at least twice a year. Along with such aspirations comes the logistical necessity of creating or deepening ties with local powers, especially Vietnam and Indonesia.
Nevertheless, such military maneuvering should not be overestimated. France walks a much more subtle line than the U.S. when it comes to the South China Sea dispute. It must cater to its trading and economic interests, striving to preserve the EU-China investment deal, while also coordinating closely with its European partners. “A situation to join all together against China, this is a scenario of the highest possible conflictuality. This one, for me, is counterproductive,” Macron declared during a discussion with the Washington-based Atlantic Council.
France cannot speak softly to China without the American big stick, nor can it deliver on its promises of renewed industrial sovereignty while multiplying disadvantageous trade deals. It would thus be good to remind the French President that his favored technique of the “en même temps,” which translates to “at the same time,” does not translate well to realpolitik.