Policy 360: Geopolitics in the Arctic
Global warming is perhaps the single monolithic issue facing the planet today, threatening to overturn regional and global political and economic orders. While it lays hiding on most maps, global warming is destroying perennial sea ice, increasingly leaving the Arctic sea exposed year-round at an alarming rate. With this reveal of waterways comes the emergence of new trade routes and maritime territory that state actors may seek to reap the benefits of. How economic and political matters are conducted in the Arctic—and how far states are willing to influence such matters—is a disruptive issue that today’s politicians are required to manage.
This piece focuses on the positions and ambitions of states in the Arctic region as they watch the melting of sea ice with the rest of the world. While the geopolitics of the Arctic region will undoubtedly overthrow existing international trade routes and influence great power international relations, only a handful of countries have a direct say in how the region is governed. Canada and Russia have the greatest territorial claims in the region, and both states see opportunities arising from their newly exposed waters—Canada believes it can use its new maritime territory and access to international waters to gain international prestige, whereas Russia believes it can do the same to increase state profit. The tensions between Greenland and Denmark are on full display in the context of the melting Arctic, agitating one of Europe’s main points of access to the region. Finally, against the backdrop of these developments, the United States is also becoming a more present force in the region, as it tries to maintain its superpower status in the context of growing Russian and Chinese power.
This roundtable aims to illuminate the geopolitics of a region that are changing as a direct result of global warming, and on a broader level, how changes within a geographic landscape have immense consequences for political developments. Unlike most geopolitical conflicts unfolding around the world, the struggle over control of the Arctic region is relatively new and quickly intensifying. The crisis of melting glacial sea ice will require international support from all corners of the globe. In the meantime, the world will monitor how regional actors take advantage of their melting geopolitical order.
Canada’s International Ambitions Through its Arctic Policy
By Jeremy Zhang, General Studies ’23
The Arctic is a part of Canada’s national identity, as it is home to many Canadian communities and a vital part of the country’s history and culture. 40% of the nation’s total land mass is in the Arctic, allowing it to preside over much of the Arctic region’s coastlines and abundant natural resources. As climate change melts much of the Arctic glaciers, opens international shipping routes, exposes potential natural resources, and increases the capacity for more regional tourism and residential development, Canada hopes to establish itself as a leader in the governance of the Arctic. It envisions a “stable, rules-based region with clearly defined boundaries,” along with a powerful economy, successful communities, and a sustainable environment.
Under the Harper government in 2010, four pillars of Canada’s strategy were outlined to guide the country’s Arctic foreign policy: exercising sovereignty, advancing economic and social development, safeguarding the environment, and clearly delineating governance throughout the region. This strategy has largely continued under the Trudeau administration, which in 2019 released its Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (ANPF) with additional focus on indigenous voices in its policy creation.
Canada’s Arctic foreign policy centers around preserving the Arctic as a region of peace and reinforcing the international legal framework, especially through the eight-state Arctic Council—a forum engaging Arctic states in the discussion of important regional issues. Perhaps as greater international powers such as the United States, China, and Russia seek to exploit the Arctic’s natural resources, Canada will try to play a mediating role, pushing these players to incorporate into their policies consideration of environmental protection, minimally destructive practices, and indigenous populations’ rights. This could certainly be possible, given the amount of land and maritime passageways Canada controls in the Arctic, as many international polar operations would likely have to involve Canadians to some degree.
At face value, the government appears to want to assume this role, especially by giving indigenous voices a larger role in the decision making and foreign policy priorities of the country. However, this has not always been practiced, as evidenced by the United States–Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement in December 2016. During the final days of the Obama presidency, a set of measures was announced as the outgoing administration tried to rush policy objectives before the inauguration of President Donald Trump. Indigenous leaders in the Arctic only learnt about it hours ahead of time, to their dismay. This in turn raised the question of whether the government would prioritize external interests over its promises, values, and relationship with the indigenous communities in the Arctic.
What is apparent is that Canada sees the expanding interest in the Arctic as an opportunity to branch out from the middle-power status it normally occupies in the international order, and hopes to leverage its territory and populations to be a leader in global Arctic governance. Whether it can adhere to its commitment to indigenous populations and its values of socioeconomic development and environmental preservation remains to be seen.
Security Considerations for Russian Profit in the Arctic
By Henry Petrillo, General Studies ’23
Russia has long maintained an interest in controlling the North Pole, starting with expeditions in the age of exploration, through the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, and still today. Contemporary prioritization of the Arctic for Russian policy mirrors efforts by Joseph Stalin in the 1930s to “win” the race for the North Pole. President Vladimir Putin has tapped into this legacy to bolster his vision for Russian nationalism. Portraying policy decisions designed to secure control over the North Pole as necessary for the acquisition of Russia’s true historical inheritance has therefore helped justify the country’s increased expenditure on the region.
Russian investment in consolidating control over the North Pole has taken many forms. Most notable is the development of a world-class nuclear-powered fleet of ice-breaking ships. The pinnacle of Russia’s efforts to create an unrivalled ice-breaking fleet is the recently unveiled Arktika, the world’s most powerful operational ice-breaker, which entered service in 2020. Russia has also upgraded airfields, search and rescue, and radar functionality in the region. In general, expanded Russian military capacity in the Arctic region has been steady and decisive. The intended results of this military upgrade are two-fold: secure the economic benefits that the North Pole has to offer and provide a rebuttal to increasingly aggressive NATO encroachment on Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.
The spoils of the Arctic offer economic benefits in addition to military and political ones. From a resource perspective, the Arctic region is said to hold a quarter of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves. The potential surplus from Arctic resources could help bolster a Russian economy for years to come, which currently relies on hydrocarbons for 40 to 50% of the federal budget and for two-thirds of its exports.
Russia is hoping to facilitate the transition of a large proportion of world trade to go through the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The benefit of using the NSR to transport goods from Asia to Europe is a one-third reduction in the amount of shipping time. Previously, this route had not been utilized because of ice-caps and lack of technological capabilities, but melting in the Arctic Zone and Russian investment in its ice-breaking fleet has helped overcome those obstacles. If this transition were to occur—the target amount of trade being 66% of current traffic through the Suez Canal or 8% of global trade in total—Russian authority over Asian-European trade would expand immensely.
In order to optimize the potential offered by Arctic hegemony and to shift Asian exports such that they travel through the NSR over the Suez Canal, it is essential that Russia maintain positive relations with China. Russia must also maintain a strategic edge over other Arctic states, especially the Nordic states, in order to disincentivize attempts to block the European exit of the NSR, both for trade coming from Asia and any exports Russia is hoping to generate from resources procurement in the Arctic. Russian hegemony over the North Pole should be perceived as a serious security threat by the entirety of NATO, as the front-line of any future conflict is set to vastly expand over land and sea should Russia come to dominate the region, which would create a unique and daunting challenge for the bloc’s defensibility.
Denmark, Who? Greenland is Open for Business
By Juan Solbes, Columbia College ’24
Greenland is a player with massive potential in the Arctic Circle, key to Denmark’s ambitions in an increasingly cutthroat regional stage. The autonomous territory has gone from direct Danish rule to virtual independence; today, Denmark retains only the powers of monetary policy and, more relevant to the Arctic, foreign policy. The development of the Arctic, home to a significant portion of global fuel reserves and enormous strategic opportunities for global powers, is causing rifts in the otherwise harmonious relationship between Nuuk and Copenhagen. Denmark faces a unique dilemma regarding its Arctic strategy: it must balance its posture on the world stage, a burgeoning Greenlandic independence movement, and Nuuk’s desire for foreign investment.
So far, Danish Arctic policy has been centered on sustainable growth and social development. Copenhagen emphasizes the importance of renewable energy, safe exploitation of resources, and stronger integration to global trade while focusing on sustainability and benefits to Arctic residents. Defensive capabilities form another essential component of Denmark’s Arctic strategy. Last February, the Frederiksen government announced a 6% increase in defense spending dedicated to Arctic defense and surveillance, a result of U.S. and NATO pressure to oppose Russian and Chinese military policy in the region.
Further complicating Denmark’s Arctic strategy are its increasingly tenuous ties with Greenland. Greenlandic politics are slowly gravitating towards independence: Siumut, the historically dominant party, faced a leadership challenge in which former Premier Kim Kielsen lost his position as leader to independence advocate Erik Jensen last year. This year’s elections resulted in Siumut losing control for the second time in Greenlandic history, with the separatist Inuit Ataqatigiit gaining a majority in Parliament. Polls show that a majority of citizens envision an independent Greenland “sometime in the future.” However, the independence envisioned hinges on Danish Arctic policy.
Greenland is highly dependent on a $650 million annual subsidy from the Danish government. Development and exploitation of its access to the Arctic are essential for a transition to economic independence. Such is the desire for self-reliance that Greenland, highly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, has yet to sign the Paris Agreement, unable to reject the source of revenue from natural resources without green alternatives in place. Conditions have left Greenland vulnerable to intrusion by powers like China, with funding leading to a potentially Chinese-controlled Greenlandic private sector, raising alarm across the West. The Biden administration responded in kind, recognizing how Greenland’s need for investment makes it an attractive target for strategic positioning.
Denmark and its allies are walking a tightrope regarding Greenland. The territory is at a crossroads between dissatisfactory dependence on Denmark and independence with little defense against encroachment by foreign powers. Denmark’s best bet would be to continue subsidizing Nuuk while encouraging investment by the United States and NATO allies. However, Chinese spending power is hard to match, and if the price is right, Nuuk might just open up and give Beijing a foothold between North America and Europe. Both scenarios have powerful policy implications for the geopolitics of the region, making Greenland the one to watch in the race for Arctic hegemony.
As the United States Grows More Invested in the Arctic, International Implications Arise
By Ariana Eftimiu, Barnard College ’25
International law mandates that all states in the Arctic region, including the United States, share their claims to the region’s maritime territory. Some states have made advances that suggested their willingness to place a greater stake and address the changing security situation in the Arctic. Although U.S. interest and involvement in the Arctic region have waned in recent decades, they have recently increased amid a competitive international environment.
The U.S.’ strategy in the North Pole is turning into one of military defense and applied offensive realist ideology, particularly seeking to monitor the aims of Russia and China. In 2019, the U.S. invested $655 million for a Coast Guard icebreaker in the Arctic region, the first ever “Polar Security Cutter.” Russia and China, albeit having more icebreakers, spend significantly less on their militaries overall—$61.7 billion and $252 billion respectively, compared to the U.S.’s $778 billion, allowing for much better defense potential in the Arctic Region. With discussion of hegemonic control at stake vis-à-vis U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations, the U.S. would not allow itself to be derailed by the ambitions of China or Russia in the Arctic region.
As a result, the U.S. is anticipated to have a significantly greater, deplorable icebreaker fleet by 2029, as well as a naval base in Alaska’s Bering Sea. The U.S. is also concentrating on extending the life of the Coast Guard’s heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and growing better informed on “cost estimates” and “technology readiness” for Arctic infrastructure. It is important to note that the U.S.’ increased ambition in the North Pole results from a desire for the strategic defense of its power and interests against these growing potential hegemons, particularly as Russia no longer sees the region as a “zone of peace.”
In June 2020, the U.S. spearheaded in the direction of greater Arctic exploration and control, unveiling the “Memorandum on Safeguarding United States National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions.” The memorandum assured that it aimed to “protect [U.S.] national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, and to retain a strong Arctic security presence alongside… allies and partners.” Overall, it ensures a newfound “persistent United States presence in the Antarctic region.”
Augmented U.S. interest in the Arctic could continue to strain U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations. As the U.S.’ relationship with the Arctic evolves into one that involves additional exploitation of resources and pronounced intercontinental hierarchy, the country’s re-entrance into the region will lead to a geopolitical power struggle. While the U.S. is presently concerned with reestablishing regional security forces, it is likely that the trajectory of U.S. presence will mean competing with Russia and China for the Arctic’s natural resources, especially liquid natural gas and hydrocarbons—the major resources required for the successful realization of independent and competitive economies.