Policy 360: The JCPOA
Launched in March 2021, Policy 360 is a new initiative by Columbia Political Review that aims to assess policies from around the world on similar political issues. Its goal is to highlight and provoke critical discussions through an international lens, broadening American-centric perspectives on pertinent political issues. This is the second piece of an ongoing series.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, has made global headlines in the past few weeks. Often touted as a hallmark foreign policy achievement of former United States President Barack Obama’s second term, the JCPOA was intended to limit Tehran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for lifts on oil and financial sanctions. In light of U.S. President Joe Biden’s bids to renegotiate the terms of the deal, several involved stakeholders have remained divided over the effects of revising foreign policy strategy towards Tehran.
This piece focuses on the differing perspectives that states ranging from the United States to Russia have wielded regarding the prospect of a revised deal. It aims to provide readers with a broad overview of the varied approaches towards the JCPOA: while Biden faces the challenge of steering its foreign policy towards Tehran in a direction that differs from his predecessor who reinforced sanctions during his term, Saudi Arabia and Israel have voiced opposition to a revised deal, despite the latter’s close allyship with the United States. The deal may also engender unintended consequences—aside from potentially spurring the continued sustenance of Hezbollah activities, it may also provide Russia and China with a strategic advantage if the United States continues to totter in its approach.
This roundtable aims to highlight key touchpoints from the perspective of some of the JCPOA’s most pertinent stakeholders, with each section ending off with policy recommendations. Yet it is also important to recognize that these suggestions are not immutable, given the fast-changing nature of negotiations surrounding the deal. With talks on the EU’s involvement in renegotiations and Iran’s upcoming presidential elections, how the deal unfolds—in addition to its political and economic effects—remains to be determined.
With the United States’ Transition from Trump to Biden, Reasserting the United States’ Position on the JCPOA is Critical
By Jenna Yuan, Columbia College ’24
The Iran Nuclear Deal, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has been making headlines recently in the United States as President Joe Biden attempts renegotiations. Despite clear signals from Biden administration figures like Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Press Secretary Jen Psaki about the United States’ new commitment to resurrecting the JCPOA moving forward, the revival effort is facing resistance from Iran due to the battered history of the deal.
When then-President Barack Obama signed the JCPOA on behalf of the United States in 2015, administration allies lauded the deal as a breakthrough for peace and stability. For Obama, the JCPOA represented a major foreign policy accomplishment, one that he had been working toward since he took office in 2008. However, Republicans and even some Democrats immediately signaled their strong opposition to the deal. Ultimately, the Obama administration was able to garner over 41 votes to block a disapproval resolution. Still, many senators, including all Republicans and Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Joe Manchin (D-WV), questioned Iran’s willingness to faithfully cooperate with the deal’s terms and characterized the deal’s loosening of economic sanctions as enabling Iran to further destabilize the region through proxy wars.
Thus, when Republican President Donald Trump took office, his largely anti-JCPOA administration took the opportunity to unilaterally withdraw from the deal in 2018. Citing the deal’s “sunset” provisions—which allowed Iran to build up uranium enrichment capability following the expiration of restrictions after designated periods of time—and failure to account for ballistic missiles, the withdrawal was part of the Trump administration's ill-conceived “maximum pressure” strategy. Under this strategy, the United States reimposed the sanctions it had previously lifted when Iran met JCPOA requirements. Despite Iran’s reinstatement of its nuclear program in the absence of the deal, key actors within the administration, such as National Security Advisor John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, still stubbornly refused to change course.
Indeed, President Biden should immediately backpedal on Trump’s disastrous course of action and attempt to revive the JCPOA. However, as experts like former Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert J. Einhorn argue, the JCPOA’s provisions must be accompanied by a coherent broader regional strategy. The United States must ensure follow-through on all aspects of the deal: guaranteeing Iran receives the economic benefits the deal promised, reassuring allies about the strength of U.S. security commitments in the region, opening the door to further cooperation and de-escalation with Iran and allies, and finally, convincing the American public and domestic political actors of the efficacy of the strategy. After four years of inane U.S. foreign policy, the JCPOA and broader Iranian strategy present a critical opportunity for the Biden administration to move the world towards stability again.
The Iran Nuclear Deal and Saudi Arabia’s Quest for Regional Dominance
By Kaitlyn Saldanha, Barnard College ’24
Since its initial signing in 2015, the JCPOA has faced some of its harshest opposition from the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. Dissenting from the wide array of Western states in strong support of the deal, the Kingdom identifies Iran as a regional source of “destabilizing aggression,” which the United States and European Union sanction relief provided by the deal would only intensify.
Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran predate many of the modern schisms of the Arab world. Many assume this feud to be based on differences in Islamic interpretation, with Saudi Arabia being largely Sunni and Iran predominantly Shia. The issue, however, stems more from political rather than religious differences. The 1979 Iranian Revolution saw the emergence of a new kind of theocratic republic, and with this shift came a new push led by Ayatollah Khomeini to assert Iranian dominance in the region. Hence, the feud between Iran and Saudi Arabia is based on a competition for leadership and dominance in the Islamic World.
The Saudi government initially expressed support for the initial signing of the JCPOA in 2015 by the P5+1 bloc, which includes the United States, France, China, the United Kingdom, and Germany, on the basis of resisting nuclear militarization in the Arab world. This stamp of approval was later revoked, and the Kingdom emerged as a central opponent of the deal. According to the Saudi Press Agency, “The Iranian regime... took advantage of the economic benefits afforded by the lifting of sanctions and used them to continue its destabilizing activities in the region, especially by developing its ballistic missiles and supporting terrorist organizations in the region, including Hezbollah and the Houthi militia.” Thus, when former President Donald Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018, the Kingdom stood in strong support.
The Saudi claim of opposing the deal on the basis of preventing human suffering and violence is, of course, nothing more than a political bluff. Needless to say, Iran is not the only Arab state with ties to Islamic extremist groups: should Saudi Arabia sustain its message of humble humanitarianism, the Kingdom will need to abandon its own terrorist ally of Al-Qaeda in the Yemeni Civil War.
As for the future of Saudi policy on the deal, the humanitarian solution would be for Saudi Arabia to momentarily set aside the battle for regional dominance and support the deal in the name of conflict aversion, civilian safety, and regional peace. But this path of action is highly implausible.
The best way for the Saudi government to support the goal for nuclear demilitarization in the Middle East without compromising its foreign policy agenda is to take a more activist role in the negotiation process, rather than sidelining as a passive opponent. In the new and reformed JCPOA, Saudi Arabia should advocate for sanction relief only as a contingency of Iran’s neutralization of relations with violent non-state actors like Hezbollah and Houthi militias. It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be successful in including the Assad regime in this list; but, in targeting extremist paramilitary groups, the Saudi government can uphold the end goal of defunding threats to regional peace. Facing the long list of prominent JCPOA supporters, Saudi Arabia will fail in resisting Iranian encroachment on Saudi regional dominance until a more participatory and activist strategy is realized.
When it Comes to a Nuclear Iran, Israel is a Loose Cannon that Needs to be Taken Seriously
By Rohil Sabherwal, Columbia College ’24
On January 26, 2021, Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Aviv Kochavi subtly announced that the preparation of a military plan of action to address the possibility of a nuclear Iran was ongoing. Coming just days after the inauguration of President Biden, it was a clear, public warning against a return to the JCPOA.
The renegotiation of the JCPOA is a primary foreign policy goal of the Biden Administration. Just weeks after this initial, more passive military threat, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz much more explicitly expressed Jerusalem’s intent to strike Iranian nuclear sites, warning, “If the world stops them before, it's very much good. But if not, we must stand independently and we must defend ourselves by ourselves." The intended purpose of the JCPOA is to hinder Iran’s nuclear program, buying world powers at least a year to prepare should Tehran choose to nuclearize its military. Why, then, is Jerusalem threatening to take military action as a preemptive measure against a possible nuclear Iran in response to renewed talks about the revival of the very deal meant to prevent that exact possibility?
For Iran to develop nuclear capabilities, it requires enriched uranium, a functioning warhead, and a payload system capable of delivering it. From Israel’s point of view, the JCPOA not only fails to address the latter two conditions but actually paradoxically helps further them. In particular, top Israeli military advisors take issue with the deal’s sunset clauses and failure to address weaponization infrastructure.
The JCPOA does limit Iran’s immediate enrichment ability by reducing the country’s uranium stockpile by 97% and capping uranium enrichment at 3.7%. Yet most of these restrictions, at least in the original deal, were set to sunset by 2024. As Emily Landau of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv asks, “If there is no perceivable change in Iran’s military aspirations in the nuclear realm…why would sun-setting the deal be a good idea?” Furthermore, since the deal only requires Iran to rename two of its major nuclear facilities as civilian research centers, not shut them down, Iran is free to do everything but enrich uranium. The lax language of the deal even allows Iran to continue to research advanced centrifuges that could drastically reduce the time required for enrichment. More than that, as the former Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Oren argues, the deal rewards Iran by lifting billions of dollars worth of sanctions, money that has historically been used not only for advanced nuclear research but also for supporting international terror networks and non-state proxies.
On April 6, in Vienna, indirect talks between the original signers of the JCPOA aimed at bringing both the United States and Iran back into the deal got underway. Noticeably absent was Israel. Even after being inaugurated, President Biden waited almost a month to call Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. So, given Jerusalem’s valid opposition to the JCPOA, it is confusing why a historically pro-Israel U.S. president would refuse to cooperate with his deeply concerned ally.
When it comes to stability in the Middle East—and, in particular, Iran— Israel and the United States have two very different policies. Unlike the United States and the European Union, Israel is a firm believer in using robust, often militarily assertive, disincentives. On April 11, a mysterious explosion caused a power blackout at Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz, delaying ongoing nuclear activities there for up to an estimated nine months. While Israel has not publicly claimed responsibility, signaling from the international intelligence community has made it clear: Mossad, Israel’s overseas intelligence agency, is responsible. Given both Jerusalem’s “gray zone” campaign against Iranian military entrenchment in Syria and these recent tactical strikes against Iranian nuclear sites that are clearly a part of Kochavi’s military plan of action announced months earlier, it is clear that Israel is willing to follow through with deliberate action whether the United States likes it or not.
Israel is the only democratic polity in the Middle East, making it a natural ally of the United States. However, it remains firmly outside of the United States’ nuclear umbrella; not only is Israel a non-signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it is also one of only three non-signatories suspected of possessing nuclear weapons. In essence, Israel fulfills all the necessary prerequisites of successful deterrence theory, but the Biden Administration does not seem to recognize that. Israel is a desperate gazelle being backed into a corner by unilateral U.S. efforts to revive the JCPOA, and unless President Biden meaningfully reaches out soon, it will rear its horns.
How Hezbollah Symbolizes the Delicate Balance Between Iran’s Nuclear Activity and Proxy Warfare
By James Hu, Columbia College ’24
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with Germany, originally negotiated The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to stunt Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In 2015, the West feared that Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs had the potential to develop into nuclear weapons—putting the United States and its Middle Eastern allies at risk. Dissidents of the JCPOA feared that suspending sanctions on Iran would lead Tehran to ramp up other tenets of its aggressive foreign policy, including regional proxy activity. While the deal was effective in temporarily controlling Iran’s nuclear prospects, the fears exhibited by JCPOA skeptics indeed became a reality.
Financial, military, and diplomatic support for armed movements in countries stretching from Yemen to Iraq and Syria to Lebanon characterize Tehran’s proxy activity. Hezbollah, both a Lebanese political party and a militant group classified as a terrorist organization by the United States, is perhaps Iran’s most prolific proxy. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps helped create Hezbollah in the early 1980s by aiding the group against Israeli occupation. Today, the two possess a mutually beneficial relationship: Iran gives Hezbollah crucial resources, and, in return, Hezbollah allows Iran to extend its influence into Lebanon, where the organization held thirteen parliamentary seats before the national government disbanded following the 2020 Beirut explosions. Additionally, because both actors are strongly opposed to the Israeli government, Hezbollah’s airstrikes on Israel are essential for Iran’s broader goal of exerting regional dominance.
Due to the JCPOA’s sanction relief, Iran’s economy performed well in 2016, allowing the government to allocate more funds to sustain the military activities of proxies like Hezbollah. In fact, according to 2018 estimates, Tehran gives the group more than $700 million annually, which has enabled Hezbollah to expand its operations at the Israeli border and in Syria. In response, the United States and other Western countries have increasingly levied sanctions on Hezbollah-affiliated businesses and government officials in Lebanon, severely affecting the country’s economic output. Evidently, any attempt at quelling Iran’s proxy activity risks placing undue harm on the proxy’s home country.
A new nuclear deal with Iran must affirm the most basic principle of nuclear non-proliferation: ensuring peace and security. This principle demands that nuclear containment not come at the cost of exacerbating regional tensions and, more specifically, that Lebanon has a seat at the table. The United States, being the most outspoken critic of Hezbollah’s activities, could offer the organization immunity from Israeli airstrikes (which it has the power to broker as Israel’s long-time ally) if Hezbollah allows the Lebanese state to formally supervise its military arsenal. Due to its crippling economic condition and Lebanon’s rising civil unrest, Hezbollah has a unique incentive to negotiate now. Sanctions relief under the reformed JCPOA should be tied to Iran’s willingness to pacify its proxy activities and facilitate this transfer, including the sanctions reimposed in 2018 under Executive Order 13846. Under this plan, not only would the Iran nuclear deal better achieve its goal but Lebanon and Israel can establish a path forward to normalizing relations.
Uncertainty Regarding Iran Nuclear Deal Gives Russia a Strategic Advantage
By Adam Szczepankowski, Columbia College ’24
Occupying a unique space, Russia’s position on the JCPOA retains several layers of complexity. An ally of Iran, Russia has publicly reaffirmed its support for the preservation of the Nuclear Deal, as Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear last year in saying that his country “will be doing everything so that no one can destroy these agreements.” More recently, Lavrov also stated that the Russians “welcome the decision of the Joe Biden administration to return to the JCPOA,” indicating Moscow’s belief in the viability for progress on the deal following President Donald Trump’s departure from office.
In 2015, when the JCPOA was initially signed, Russia and most Western powers achieved their shared goal of preventing the development of a nuclear-armed Iran. But even then, whispers of Russian dissatisfaction with the deal circulated. Some Iranians claimed that Lavrov had hoped the deal would immediately lift the UN arms embargo on Russia’s conventional arms trade with Iran as opposed to after the five-year period agreed upon, suggesting that Russia had intended to quickly restart arms sales. Further frustrations grew from the fact that, under the agreement, Iran was permitted to purchase civilian airliners from Boeing and Airbus, which Tehran prefers over the Russian-made Sukhoi Superjet.
That all changed, however, when President Trump withdrew the United States from the deal in 2018. America moved to immediately reimpose all sanctions on Iran, opening up a window of opportunity for Moscow. Russia benefited from its ability to blame Washington for upending the deal and could pursue closer economic ties with the Islamic Republic as a means of filling the power vacuum that America left behind. Though somewhat paradoxical, Russian banks opted to reduce their transactions with Iran, for fear of American retribution.
This is all to say that Biden’s willingness to rejoin the JCPOA presents Moscow with a conundrum. As new talks begin gaining traction in Vienna, is it really in Russia’s best interest to help the United States return to the agreement?
Russian President Vladimir Putin, as politically shrewd and ruthless as he is, remains nevertheless pragmatic. Although his relationship with Biden got off to a rocky start, the Kremlin seems poised to cooperate with U.S. efforts, albeit while trying to prevent a renewed JCPOA from potentially affecting its existing relationship with Iran. Moscow’s envoy, Dmitry Polyanskiy expressed the country’s wishes in saying one “shouldn’t mix [the deal] up with a regional framework which exists” and adding that the Russians “don’t see any reasons for it [the deal] to be modified.”
Simply put, Russia gains ground when American foreign policy promotes instability like it did when the United States withdrew from the deal. Tehran no doubt sees Moscow as a more reliable partner, especially given the American hostility it has been subject to over the last four years. While the United States looks to repair relations and reestablish global leadership via the deal, Putin sleeps soundly knowing that some diplomatic wounds may never heal.
Chinese Engagement with Iran Hints at Beijing’s Foreign Policy Mindset
By Sam Braun, Columbia College ’24
China’s participation in the JCPOA and greater engagement with Iran reconcile its two cornerstone foreign policy initiatives that confound Western experts: deteriorate American hegemony and reinforce the current international world order.
China’s reopening to the West in the late 1970s proved to be a critical development toward securing these two goals. China largely sought to garner international political legitimacy by integrating itself into the world’s economic and political institutions and systems. China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization in 2001, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, and other events emblemized this development: China aimed to ascend to the world stage not as an insurgent of the liberal world order, but as an active participant accepted by the international community.
The Chinese perspective on Iran and the JCPOA provides a snapshot of China’s self-perceived position in the chaotic international political arena. As one of the original signatories of the JCPOA in 2015, China seeks a U.S. reentrance into the agreement following the Trump Administration’s withdrawal in 2018. Currently, as the Biden Administration considers talks with Iran and reentering the agreement, Chinese media praises the idea. This praise seemingly runs counter to the new developments in China’s one-on-one relations with Iran—a frontier upon which China seeks to challenge the United States in Middle East regional control.
In March 2021, China and Iran formally announced a significant economic and security agreement, one involving millions of dollars in Chinese investment in Iran set to last 25 years. China’s increased courtship of Iran is deeply troubling to U.S. officials: since the United States has no formal diplomatic relations with Iran and—resulting from its reimposed tariffs in 2018—buys relatively little oil from the state, the United States is in no position to counterbalance China’s growing influence. In advancing relations with Iran, China is both aligning itself with an influential anti-U.S. state while developing greater access to the Iranian oil market otherwise burdened by the reimposition of harsh U.S. sanctions.
The two positions China is pursuing in Iran’s foreign relations—where it is simultaneously supporting U.S. diplomacy and undermining U.S. strength in the region—do not contradict one another, but portray the narrative China attempts to construct of its global position: that of a participant in a rules-based multilateral world order. In line with previous stunts like the 2008 Olympics, China’s encouragement of U.S. reentrance into the JCPOA signals its establishment of legitimacy for itself in the current system by promoting the international status quo. China’s further engagement with Iran does not display the moves of a radical, destructive power-seeking hegemony, but one which levels the global playing field and secures a stable balance of power.
Against the backdrop of low global approval ratings of U.S. leadership, unprecedented economic uncertainty, and the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, China is in the process of recasting itself as a protector of the global status quo, which has become ever so appealing to middle power nations like Iran. China continues to practice its foreign affairs calculus, and China’s encouragement of U.S. engagement with the JCPOA is but one key equation.