New Players, New Rules: Examining Saudi Arabia’s Potential Nuclear Status
Detonation of a nuclear weapon, photo courtesy of Everett Collection/Shutterstock.
Introduction:
Recent international instability has placed the issue of nuclear proliferation into the wider discourse among scholars of international politics. To be sure, nuclear technology can be employed solely for peaceful purposes. Yet, because the consequences of using even one nuclear weapon cannot be understated, the slight mention of a country’s desire to acquire nuclear technology––technology that could translate into a deliverable warhead in the future––initiates worldwide dialogue.
In 2024, the potential of a Saudi Arabia with greater access to nuclear technology prompted such a global discussion, especially given how Riyadh finds itself in a highly volatile region. The United States, Russia, and China, the world’s leading nuclear powers, are consequently highlighted in these discussions of proliferation. Israel, although not acknowledging itself as a nuclear power, is often included in this conversation, as it is unclear whether Riyadh’s greater access to nuclear technology would encourage more or less stability in the region. Also lurking in the background for all four states is the issue of Iranian nuclear proliferation, an issue irreparably linked to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, even though Tehran itself did not participate in the deliberations mentioned by the pieces in this roundtable.
Of course, discussion of Saudi Arabia’s expanding nuclear capabilities and whether these will translate into a weapons program is still just speculation. But given the stakes involved, the four aforementioned states are deliberating what the consequences of a more nuclear Saudi Arabia will hold for them and the world.
China’s Nuclear Problem in Saudi Arabia
Theodore Griffin, CC ’27
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a strategic partner for China, primarily, though not exclusively, due to China’s energy demands. China views Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states as reliable sources of oil. Moreover, the Gulf states support China’s geopolitical strategy, best exemplified through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This project improves regional integration by connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe through land and maritime networks that shorten the route and vulnerability of China’s hydrocarbon imports by sea. Therefore, China has recently supported Saudi Arabia’s ambitions of civilian nuclear development––the research, development, and deployment of nuclear power plants for peaceful purposes. This signals China’s desire to strengthen its influence in the Middle East, while aggravating its rivalry with the United States. Ultimately, however, China should re-evaluate this development, as nuclear proliferation would result in Middle Eastern destabilization, undermine regional stability with Iran, and exacerbate China’s tensions with Western powers, particularly the US.
China has ventured to advance civilian nuclear development in Saudi Arabia. In 2012, for example, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed an agreement with King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to support Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program. In response, China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) offered to build a nuclear reactor in Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia historically prefers technology from the US and other Western nations. Accordingly, when Washington withholds nuclear technology from Riyadh, it usually turns to Beijing for assistance, reflecting its self-interest. Thus, despite this collaboration with China, Saudi Arabia has been hesitant to fully align itself with Beijing, and alternatively plays the US and China against one another, instead of developing an effective hedging strategy.
Despite this, China still supports Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program due to its energy needs. Saudi Arabia possesses an estimated 17% of the world’s petroleum reserves, making it a crucial partner for China. To illustrate, when President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in December 2022, the two countries announced a $10 billion investment deal at the Arab-China Business Summit in Riyadh. This investment supported China’s intended establishment of a regional network for energy cooperation, including expanded nuclear commerce as part of its BRI. Furthermore, China has recently facilitated the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, demonstrating Beijing’s determination to maintain influence in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
To be sure, China’s increased influence in Saudi Arabia through nuclear cooperation notwithstanding, the risks of nuclear proliferation could outweigh these advantages. If Riyadh employs Chinese nuclear technology to build a bomb, overtly or covertly, its attainment of the bomb would heighten tensions with Iran. Consequently, Tehran would almost certainly accelerate its nuclear weapons program. Moreover, due to Tehran’s ongoing tension with Saudi Arabia, Riyadh would react similarly if Iran were the initiator. In this event, Riyadh would begin to prepare nuclear infrastructure, weaponization facilities, and fuel enrichment plans, which would ultimately lead to an arms race in the Middle East. An arms race would thus raise regional tensions, and if the Saudi-Iranian proxy war of the 2010s serves as a precedent, the potential for low-scale proxy conflict and regional tensions is high, potentially restricting China’s access to Middle-Eastern oil, hindering its energy demands. Therefore, China should moderate its nuclear presence in Saudi Arabia to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
China’s involvement in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program also risks worsening its own relationship with the US. Following Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Riyadh, the Biden administration has moved to repair its strained relationship with Saudi Arabia by encouraging closer Saudi-Israeli ties. The US sees China’s growing influence in Saudi Arabia as a direct challenge, deepening the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Further nuclear cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia would intensify this rivalry, risking global conflict between the two powers.
In conclusion, China’s support for nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia is detrimental and would likely destabilize the Middle East, harm China’s own goals of resource security and regional stability, and provoke conflict with the US. To avoid exacerbating tensions, China should focus on strengthening economic and diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia through moderating its nuclear involvement.
The Dangers of a US-Saudi Nuclear Deal
Alexander Vincenti, CC ’26
The United States is considering a deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, whereby Washington would offer aid to the Saudi nuclear development program, as well as a more formal pledge to come to its defense, in exchange for a potential normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and a stronger alliance with the US. There are reasons to both support and reject such an agreement, but, at least on the nuclear ledger, Washington should continue its policy against proliferation in Saudi Arabia and not aid their nuclear program, given the lack of enforcement mechanisms to ensure the program is consistent with American interests, and the potential for escalated tensions in an already volatile region.
A Saudi nuclear deal would provide the US with multiple benefits, and it would have the potential to reshape politics in the entire Middle East region. One of the potential conditions of the plan is the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the US’s closest ally in the region. Favorable relations with a major power in the Arab world, such as Saudi Arabia, would provide Israel with further protection and legitimacy, furthering US national interests. Saudi Arabia has already stated that, absent a formal US security pledge, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, then Riyadh will follow suit. Consequently, a deal with Saudi Arabia might include a US pledge to defend Saudi Arabia to deter them from developing their own nuclear weapons in response to an Iranian nuclear breakout.
However, if Washington were to provide Saudi Arabia with civilian nuclear technology, the possibility of them acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be discounted, given the Kingdom’s history of flouting American requests. This would not serve US interests, as they are currently conceived. Saudi Arabia is a kingdom with a poor human rights record and little respect for civil liberties. Additionally, the state is highly bellicose and has a history of militarism and of supporting Islamic fundamentalist groups. Introducing more nuclear variables into the region increases the potential for escalation. Moreover, if Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons from US technology, there is little to hold them to their promise of normalized relations with Israel, or to theoretically prevent them from using the weapons against Iran. None of these scenarios further US goals in the region.
Even if the US-Saudi Arabia deal has credible and enforceable restrictions on nuclear technology exchanges for peaceful purposes, Iran will still see it as aggressive because of the deal’s potential to create a weapon, which may accelerate Tehran’s own nuclear program. Furthermore, if US-Saudi relations deteriorate, as they did during the first years of the Biden administration, there could be little preventing Saudi Arabia from developing a nuclear weapon with the American-provided nuclear tech being used for civil purposes.
The US’s longstanding policy of nonproliferation, which it shares with several other powers, including China and Russia, presents another thorn in this potential deal. By striking a deal with Saudi Arabia, the US not only turns its back on its established policy, losing international credibility on disarmament, but it may also incentivise its rivals to make similar deals with other countries, helping them arm states hostile to the US. This risk of eroding the credibility of the nonproliferation regime is one that is currently intolerable to the US and its wider interests.
While there are benefits to a Saudi nuclear deal, the danger of increased instability in the Middle East, the lack of credible enforcement mechanisms for such a deal, and the deterioration of nonproliferation agreements are not in America’s national interest. Therefore, the US should pursue negotiations with Saudi Arabia at the exclusion of concessions on nuclear technology, instead focusing on other mechanisms to reassure Saudi Arabia and strengthen US influence in the region.
Nuclear Checkmate: Israel’s Strategic Dilemma in the Face of Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Ambitions
Soenke Pietsch, CC ’26
Saudi Arabia’s potential nuclear ambitions pose a complex strategic challenge for Israel, as they could fundamentally alter the regional power balance and force a recalibration of Israel’s longstanding nuclear deterrence policy. Israel should take all reasonable measures possible to ensure a Saudi failure.
Israel has long maintained a policy of preventing regional nuclear proliferation, as exemplified by its actions against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and against Syria’s alleged nuclear facility in 2007. Israel’s Begin Doctrine, a cornerstone of its national security strategy, asserts that no regional enemy committed to Israel’s destruction should be allowed to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Israel cites this policy to justify the aforementioned preemptive strikes against nuclear facilities, as well as continuing efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. However, Saudi Arabia’s recent push for nuclear technology, particularly in the context of potential normalization with Israel, presents a new challenge that does not neatly mold into the current doctrine.
Multiple factors drive Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions, including energy diversification and a desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will follow suit. This stance has raised concerns in Israel and beyond the wider Middle East about the potential for a regional nuclear arms race, given the emergence of a multistate nuclear neighborhood.
Herein lie multiple strategic challenges for Israel. A nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia would significantly shift the regional power dynamics, threatening Israel’s nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. This could erode Israel’s strategic advantage and complicate its defense posture by weakening a strategic deterrent from its defense arsenal. Moreover, the Saudi nuclear program is intrinsically linked to the Iranian factor. As Saudi Arabia views its nuclear aspirations as a counterbalance to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Israel must proceed with caution. While Israel and Saudi Arabia both share concerns about Iran—potentially even aligned interests—Israel must carefully balance its longstanding policy against nuclear proliferation with the strategic benefits of a nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia as a counterweight to Iran, the reason being that while Iraq and Syria were broadly hostile to Israel, Saudi Arabia is not.
The United States, a key ally of both Israel and Saudi Arabia, plays a crucial role in shaping the Middle East’s nuclear landscape. On the diplomatic front, Israel may leverage its relationship with the US to influence Saudi policy, especially in light of the incoming administration that has already evidenced its favoritism toward Israel in the Middle East. Beyond the US, Israel might also engage regional states to contain nuclear proliferation, possibly working with other Arab countries that share concerns about a nuclear arms race. The normalization agreements between Israel and countries such as the UAE and Bahrain (known as the Abraham Accords) provide a potential framework for such broader cooperation.
On the other hand, Israel must also play to its own strengths: covert actions could form another pillar of Israel’s strategy. This might involve intelligence gathering and sabotage operations, which are similar to those allegedly conducted against Iran’s nuclear program. Cyber warfare could also be a potential tool, given Israel’s advanced capabilities in this domain.
A potential Saudi nuclear program would also likely force Israel to reassess its nuclear deterrence policy. Israel has long maintained a policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying its nuclear capabilities. However, a nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia might push Israel toward a more overt nuclear posture. This shift would have significant implications for regional stability and international diplomacy by deterring adversaries without openly threatening them and avoiding international pressure to join non-proliferation treaties all while maintaining strategic flexibility. If Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear capabilities, other regional powers such as Turkey and Egypt might follow suit.
In conclusion, Israel is likely to adopt a multipronged approach to prevent Saudi nuclear capabilities. This may include diplomatic pressure, covert actions, and leveraging international alliances. Especially regarding the latter, Israel could leverage its international alliances, particularly with the US, to adopt various approaches to preventing Saudi nuclear capabilities, combining diplomatic pressure, intelligence sharing, economic incentives, and technological cooperation. This strategy could aim to convince Washington to provide an extended security guarantee to Riyadh that avoids Saudi Arabia becoming a nuclear power in the first place, while potentially using the ongoing normalization process with Arab states as leverage for further safeguards. However, the long-term implications for regional security remain uncertain. A nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia would fundamentally alter the Middle East’s strategic landscape, potentially generating a more volatile and unpredictable security environment, meaning Israel would likely prefer to avoid having to make this fateful choice. In Saudi Arabia’s ambitions, Israel faces its most significant test yet.
The Peril of Being Friends with Your Friend’s Enemy
Walter Koike-Sieira GS ’25
The Russian perspective on nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia is shaped by two overall foreign policy goals: maintain the Putin regime’s hold on power and counter US influence in the Middle East. In this regard, Russia’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia on energy prices is critical for maintaining the income that Putin relies on to fund the state budget and sustain his patronage network. However, this must now be balanced against both the direct and indirect benefits of Russia’s alliance with Iran.
While Saudi Arabia is a Russian partner in oil production, Iran remains a crucial geopolitical asset for Russia’s second and third objectives, and its significance has only grown since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In addition to diverting Western attention from the conflict, Iran has provided Russia with critical UAV technology that does not require sanctioned components, munitions, and military advisors, thereby enhancing Russia’s military capabilities in Ukraine and indirectly enhancing Russia’s influence in the Middle East. And despite recent detente, Saudi Arabia and Iran remain strategic rivals. A nuclear Saudi Arabia would cause a situation where Iran confronts three nuclear opponents: the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Because of this adverse impact on Russia’s relationship with Iran, and by extension on Russia’s wider indirect power in the region, Russia should therefore oppose nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia.
Iranian nuclear proliferation can hurt Russian goals by destabilizing the region. Russia benefits from the current low-intensity conflict in the Middle East. Iran and its proxies tie up US resources, all while Tehran sends arms to Russia. Should Saudi Arabia develop nuclear weapons, Iran may decide it needs to decrease arms exports to Russia to make up for this capacity, damaging Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent Israeli strikes have already severely weakened Iran’s proxy forces. Past events show that destabilization raises the risk of Iran feeling pressured to escalate, thereby giving Israel more leeway to target Iranian proxies. This lessens the threat the proxies pose to US regional interests, concurrently reducing the proxies’ utility to broader Russian aims. There is also the risk that a nuclear Saudi Arabia could lead to war.
Especially in the context of the recent destruction of Iranian surface-to-air missile systems, Tehran might attempt to develop nuclear weapons of its own if Saudi Arabia were to pursue nuclear weapons. This would likely result in Israeli strikes by, and possibly the US, which would again threaten Iran’s capacity to supply the Russian war effort and serve as a foil to US efforts in the Middle East, all while raising the risk of wider escalation in the region. Moscow would oppose such an outcome. Even if it is not certain that Saudi Arabian nuclear proliferation would result in conflict, the inevitable increase in tensions poses too much of a risk to Russian goals, especially given the Kremlin’s more pressing objectives in Ukraine.
Moreover, Russia’s relationship with Saudi Arabia would not be harmed by Russian opposition to nuclear proliferation, as Saudi Arabia has not yet publicly demonstrated a proactive ambition to become a nuclear state. Because the US other nuclear powers like Israel oppose proliferation, Russian opposition is highly unlikely to damage the relationship. The current partnership is primarily based on economic incentives, meaning that maintaining strong relations with Iran would not negatively impact ties with Saudi Arabia. In this regard, halting nuclear proliferation to Saudi Arabia is a rare area of agreement between the United States and Russia.
Conclusion:
The possibility of Riyadh’s expanding nuclear development has prompted international deliberation, though the conversations outlined in this roundtable have revolved solely around a hypothetical. Nevertheless, some policy realities are becoming increasingly clear.
First, in the event Saudi Arabia opts to develop a bomb using nuclear technology––be it American or Chinese––the regional consequences for the region could either be greater stability or further nuclear-induced instability. The possibility of the latter will likely mean both Washington and Jerusalem will opt for restrictions on the type of nuclear technology Saudi Arabia gains access to. Talks of a formal American security guarantee to the Kingdom, and of greater intra-regional cooperation against Tehran, are also likely to accelerate.
Second, the West is not alone in finding itself opposing greater nuclear proliferation with Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Moscow and Beijing would be remiss if they saw further regional instability blowback on their ambitions in other areas of the world, or their ally in Tehran weakened further. Consequently, Russia and China are likely to follow Washington’s lead and oppose the further proliferation of nuclear technology to Riyadh.
Almost all powers, therefore, prefer that the above hypothetical discussion remain hypothetical. Yet, as the global order continues to experience conflict-induced turmoil, discussions of more nuclear proliferation may not remain purely academic in nature. South Korea, Japan, and even Egypt are also reconsidering their opposition to nuclear proliferation. Ultimately, however, the most important variable in this conversation will be the future of America’s foreign policy. If Washington continues serving as a reliable security guarantor around the world, further discussion of nuclear proliferation will likely continue to remain hypothetical. But if Washington recoils to a more isolationist impulse or fosters a rethink of how it chooses to extend its nuclear umbrella, it is possible that the above conversation will be but a harbinger of a world where nuclear weapons are no longer the weapons of the few.
This roundtable was edited by Ariana Eftimiu, Lucas de Gamboa, and Claire Thornhill.