Drawing Lines in the Caucasus: Four Nations, One Corridor
The Tatev Monastery near the village of Tatev in the Syunik Province in southeastern Armenia. Photo courtesy of Diego Delso .
Introduction
The Zangezur Corridor, a transportation route proposed by Azerbaijan that would pass through Armenia’s southern province, has emerged as yet another point of regional tension in the South Caucasus, already reeling from the carnage of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. This contested project highlights the complex web of national interests and power dynamics among four key regional actors. For Azerbaijan, the corridor represents a strategic opportunity to establish direct access to its Nakhchivan exclave and strengthen economic ties with Türkiye and other Turkic states, potentially transforming the country into a vital hub for Eurasian trade. Armenia, by contrast, views the project as a threat to national sovereignty and a potential vulnerability in its ongoing territorial disputes with Azerbaijan.
Iran’s opposition to the corridor stems from fears of diminishing regional influence, especially as the corridor would eliminate its border with Armenia and further the consolidation of a Turkic alliance that could challenge its economic and geopolitical interests in the Caucasus. Tehran’s alternative proposal, the Aras Corridor, which would extend through Iranian territory, reflects its efforts to maintain strategic relevance while promoting regional connectivity. Meanwhile, Russia’s support for the Zangezur Corridor, despite its traditionally close ties with Armenia, underscores Moscow’s delicate balancing act in maintaining influence in the South Caucasus while maintaining vital ties with Iran.
This roundtable examines these competing perspectives on the Zangezur Corridor, exploring how the proposal has become a proxy for broader geopolitical ambitions and security concerns in a region marked by historical tensions and shifting alliances.
Fears of Geopolitical Irrelevance: The Zangezur Corridor’s Implications for Iran
By Ani Bayramyan
A trilateral ceasefire agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia sealed the second Nagorno-Karabakh war on November 10, 2020. As part of the collective agreement, Russian border guards would control the Armenia-Azerbaijan transport corridor known as the Zangezur Corridor, threatening Armenia’s sovereignty. While Elchin Amirbayov, the Azerbaijan President's senior envoy for special assignments, stated that the Zangezur Corridor clause would be addressed at a later date, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov resurfaced the topic in September of this year during a two-day diplomatic visit to Azerbaijan. This issue extends far beyond Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia, as the reopening of the corridor would affect the alignment of Iran’s northern border. In an unprecedented statement of criticism, Iran voiced protest against Russia’s insistence on this arrangement, labeling it “totally unacceptable and a red line for Iran.” To address Iran's security and economic concerns, as well as regional stability at large, Iran should promote the revival of the Aras Corridor’s development instead of the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, as it would encourage economic growth while restricting the consolidation of the Turkic alliance, and work against Türkiye’s attempts at securing regional dominance.
At its most basic level, the Zangezur Corridor will connect Baku to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region, Azerbaijan’s western exclave separated from the rest of the country by Armenian territory. According to the ceasefire agreement, “Armenia shall guarantee the security of transport connections” between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan claims that the direct link between Europe and Asia will bolster trade between various regional players, particularly facilitating open trade among Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Russia. However, this poses a direct threat to Iran, as should the corridor open, Azerbaijan would no longer need to use a route through Iran for economic transports, potentially diminishing Iran’s importance as a key transit route in the region. Furthermore, this route would isolate Iran from the South Caucasus, as the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be covered by the corridor, reducing Iran’s territorial leverage over Armenia. This shift in the geographical landscape would translate into a palpable curtailment of Iran's regional influence, both economic and political.
Additionally, the consolidation of a Turkic alliance could threaten the dominant Iranian presence in the region by presenting a collaborative economic counterforce to Iran's status quo. The Zangezur Corridor provides Türkiye with direct access to Turkic-speaking countries. Previously, Türkiye accessed Central Asia through Iran or other routes. The reopening of this corridor would enable Türkiye to connect directly with Azerbaijan and, from there, to Central Asia. By reducing the transport distance between Azerbaijan and Türkiye by approximately 344 km, compared to the currently used Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the corridor could lower international trade costs and solidify Türkiye's economic influence in the region. Furthermore, this development would foster further political cooperation within the Turkic world under the cultural umbrella of Turkic-speaking nations known as the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), fueling Iran’s fear of a Turkic alliance challenging Iran’s regional importance. Coupled with a diminished role in Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s affairs, the Zangezur Corridor poses a threat to Iran’s political and economic leverage in the region.
A proposed alternative is the Aras corridor, which would serve as a compromise solution among the various regional stakeholders. This corridor would pass through Iran’s East Azerbaijan province and link Ağbənd (Aghbend) in Azerbaijan’s Zangilan District to southern Nakhchivan, bypassing Armenia. It would promote regional interconnectivity and enhance Iran's role in the region by overseeing Armenian and Azerbaijan transportation, while also providing Iran with a railway connection to Europe and Russia, thus increasing its regional importance. In contrast to the Zangezur Corridor proposal, this route would bolster Iran's influence rather than diminish it, potentially balancing the power dynamic with Türkiye.
Tehran’s concerns are only growing over the opening of the Zangezur Corridor in the Caucasus, which holds the potential to undermine Iran’s role as a key transit route in the region. The opening of the corridor would foster more direct links between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, as well as the Turkic nations at large, reducing Iran’s importance as a critical regional transit hub. The opening of the Zangezur Corridor would further provide for erosion of its territorial leverage over Armenia, which plays a significant role in Iran’s strategic interactions with the Caucasus. Consequently, Iran should advocate for reviving the development of the Aras Corridor, as it would foster economic development while limiting the consolidation of the Turkic alliance, preventing the expansionist visions of neo-imperial Türkiye.
A Fine Line: How Russia Can Protect National Interests Through Diplomacy
By Greta Herman
Following the geopolitical and economic pitfalls Russia endured after its invasion of Ukraine, the nation explored alternative trade routes to reestablish access to oil, arms, and regional influence in Middle Eastern and European markets. The creation of the Zangezur corridor, which would run through Azerbaijan and Armenian territories, has served as a substitute for former Russian trade relations. Despite Russia’s fruition because of the trade route, Russia has consequently undermined relations with Iran, only hindering the nation’s overall alliances.
Prior to Russia’s beginning to trade in the Zangezur Corridor, Iran spearheaded a route dubbed the “Aras Corridor” that connected Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan (separated by Armenia and Iran), giving Iran more power in controlling the Aras Corridor. The Zangezur Corridor would instead stretch from Turkey to Russia, passing through both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and leaving Iran with little influence on the route. Russia, more so than Iran, is incentivized to sustain diplomatic allies following the war in Ukraine. However, this has muddled relations with Iran, given that prior to the corridor’s implementation, the territory was under Armenian control, and through the support of Western powers – Turkey and Israel – Azerbaijan was able to seize the region. Western influence in the region has particularly upset Iran, particularly as Russia approves of Azerbaijani control, seemingly out of a desire to rekindle ties with Western powers. While working with Azerbaijan in order to sustain relations with the United States allies, Russia has thereby compromised its relationship with Iran. While Russia could hawkishly respond to Iran’s forceful threats in response to losing dominion in the region, doing so would only further disadvantage Russia, given the lack of allies and its role as a regional outlier. Following Russian President Vladamir Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan’s capital city, Baku, Ebrahim Azizi, head of the Iranian Parliament on National Security and Foreign Policy issued a statement stating that Russia’s involvement in the corridor and amicable relations with Azerbaijan would have repercussions: “We warn those who pursue such illusions that the consequences of these decisions will be heavy and costly.” While Azizi’s language was vague, Iranian leaders have insinuated that the expansion of military intervention if Armenia does not regain control of the region. Iran is prioritizing its own national interests over its relationship with Russia, given Russia’s backing of Azerbaijani control in the corridor. Because of Iran’s forcefulness in this matter, Russia should comply with diplomatic efforts in order to protect its geopolitical power and relations with Iran.
Russia has further strained relationships in the region after Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, accused the Armenian leadership of backsliding on a deal regarding expanding routes in Armenia’s Syunik region. By “calling out” Armenian officials, Lavrov has essentially tainted relations with Armenia. Alternatively, Russia should comply with Armenia’s ‘Crossroad of Peace’ initiative, which aims to protect the mutual interests of all regions. While the ‘Crossroad of Peace’ initiative is broadly outlined, it appears to be a step in the right direction in regards to dividing power in the region militarily and economically across the corridor. Crossroads for Peace further called for Russia “to refrain from sabotaging through biased statements neither the project nor the efforts to achieve peace in the South Caucasus.,” indicating thatRussia has currently positioned itself as a hazard to peace from Armenia’s perspective. In part, Russia’s continued deployment of guards has contributed to the aggressive position the nation has taken in sustaining the trade of arms and oil. Russia should instead work to comply with Iranian and Armenian demands, as opposed to focusing on expanding military power in the region.
While the initially proposed Aras Corridor would provide significant leverage to Iran, this would also tarnish Russia’s relations with Armenia. This route, which would gain Iran more geopolitical reign in the region, would diminish Russia’s regional influence given its dependence on the current corridor. Rather than comply fully with Iran’s alternative proposed corridor, Russia should focus on rebuilding relations with Armenia through the ‘Crossroad of Peace’ initiative to reframe its role in ongoing proposals. Russia’s current position as an aggressive force seeking to expand border guards, and as a strong ally to Azerbaijan paints Russia as unwilling to recognize Iranian and Armenian geopolitical interests in sustaining their territorial boundaries and safeguarding their respective nations. Russia, through compliance with the ‘Crossroad for Peace’ initiative and sustaining relations with Iran and Armenia, would better protect national diplomatic interests and re-establish itself as a friend rather than a foe.
Stepping to the plate: Azerbaijan’s fervent pursuit of the Zangezur Corridor
By Edward Habboosh
Azerbaijan’s push for the Zangezur Corridor reflects its broader goal of establishing regional dominance by securing direct access to Nakhchivan and strengthening economic ties with Türkiye and Europe. This proposed corridor, which would cut across southern Armenia, represents a cornerstone of Azerbaijan’s ambitions to consolidate its influence in the South Caucasus and beyond. The Zangezur Corridor’s significance stems from its potential to directly link Azerbaijan to Türkiye and Europe, bypassing traditional Georgia transit routes. For President Ilham Aliyev, this project is vital to his vision of transforming Azerbaijan into a central hub for international trade. By leveraging the country’s strategic location, the corridor would enhance Azerbaijan’s role in global supply chains and cement its position as a pivotal player in the region’s economic development.
Since reclaiming territory during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan has worked to maximize its geopolitical and economic leverage. The Zangezur Corridor, as part of this strategy, would not only solidify Azerbaijan’s territorial gains but also create a direct route for Azerbaijani goods to flow into European and global markets. This enhanced connectivity is expected to boost Azerbaijan’s competitiveness, attract foreign investment, and expand its economic partnerships. The economic implications of the Zangezur Corridor are central to Azerbaijan’s strategic calculus. By connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan (and by extension, Türkiye), the corridor would streamline trade routes, reduce transportation costs, and accelerate the flow of goods. For Azerbaijani industries, this means greater access to export markets and opportunities to diversify the economy.
Moreover, Azerbaijan plans to develop infrastructure around the corridor to amplify its regional economic dominance, and said plans should continue investments in roads, railways, and logistics hubs will position Azerbaijan as a gateway for Eurasian trade, increasing its importance for both regional and global commerce. Beyond economics, the Zangezur Corridor strengthens Azerbaijan’s geopolitical position. Establishing this transit route would showcase Azerbaijan’s ability to drive regional initiatives, demonstrating its growing leadership in the South Caucasus. The corridor’s development aligns closely with Azerbaijan’s strategic alliance with Türkiye, further deepening their cooperation in trade, energy, and security, an ideal outcome for Azerbaijan.
In addition, Azerbaijan’s focus on the Zangezur Corridor appears to highlight its broader ambitions to diminish dependence on existing routes that pass through unfriendly or less stable regions. By creating and advocating for alternatives, Azerbaijan reduces vulnerability to external pressures, thereby enhancing its sovereignty and regional autonomy. Thus, Azerbaijan has adopted a proactive diplomatic strategy to advance the Zangezur Corridor. Domestically, it emphasizes the corridor’s role in bolstering national pride and economic progress. Internationally, Azerbaijan is positioning the project as a driver of regional integration and prosperity. By framing the corridor as a mutually beneficial initiative, Azerbaijan aims to secure cooperation from key stakeholders.
To ensure the project’s success, Azerbaijan is also engaging in high-level negotiations to mitigate potential opposition. By offering economic incentives, such as shared infrastructure development and revenue-sharing agreements, Azerbaijan is working to present the Zangezur Corridor as a win-win solution for all involved parties. Evidently, the Zangezur Corridor embodies Azerbaijan’s broader ambitions for regional dominance and economic prosperity. It serves as a key instrument for achieving President Aliyev’s vision of a stronger, more influential Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan should thus continue to support the corridor initiative. By prioritizing connectivity, economic growth, and geopolitical strategy, Azerbaijan is shaping its future as a leader in the region and a critical player on the global stage.
Walking the Sovereign Tightrope: Why Armenia Should Embrace the Aras Corridor as a Strategic Alternative to the Zangezur Plan
By Tazia Mohammad
Azerbaijan’s campaign to forcibly establish the Zangezur Corridor on Armenian soil is coercive in nature and poses an immediate threat to Armenia’s sovereignty. However, as outlined in Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s 2023 “Crossroads for Peace” plan, Armenia is not fundamentally opposed to strengthening trade connectivity throughout the Caucasus region. As a result, Armenia should focus its efforts on supporting Iran’s proposed Aras Corridor as a strategic alternative to the Zangezur Corridor.
From Armenia’s perspective, allowing Azerbaijan to develop a militarized corridor within its borders would be an absolute non-starter. Both nations have been embroiled in a decades-long territorial dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, a former autonomous zone primarily occupied by ethnic Armenians, which has rendered their relationship overtly hostile. If the Zangezur Corridor is paved as planned across Armenia’s Syunik province, Armenia will not only face an infringement on its national sovereignty, but also increased vulnerability to Azerbaijani invasion due to the checkpoint-free transport the corridor would provide within Armenia’s borders. These concerns are furthered by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev’s troubling remarks that, should Armenia deny the corridor’s construction, Azerbaijan will utilize violent force to implement the transportation route.
The Zangezur Corridor would also sever Armenia’s border with its regional ally, Iran. This would weaken the strength of their diplomatic ties by preventing the fluid exchange of goods, services, and military aid across their borders. As Armenia relies on Iran for military support, stunting this relationship would shift the regional power balance away from Armenia and further towards the triangular alliance between Russia, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan. Losing access to open-border trade with Iran could also create increased economic dependence on Russia, Armenia’s largest import partner, which could hinder national goals of diplomatic integration with the West. Deepened reliance on Russian imports also poses a severe risk to public well-being should relations with Putin sour.
In lieu of this invasive campaign, the Caucasus nations should pursue a more collaborative and egalitarian approach to catalyzing economic activity. Pashniyan’s proposed “Crossroads for Peace” initiative, for instance, would rebuild intraregional Soviet-era transportation routes to streamline trade while respecting all involved nations’ sovereignty. Areas along these routes would benefit from the jobs that such infrastructure projects would create, as well as from foreign investment in their development. In building new Eurasian transport links, Armenia and its neighbors could also provide a strategic alternative for Western nations seeking to trade and strengthen ties with Central Asia without relying on Russian-controlled pathways. This would reshape regional dynamics, lessening Russia’s economic dominance and easing Armenia’s integration with the West.
Unfortunately, geopolitical blockage has rendered Pashniyan’s plan unfeasible, as its success hinges on Armenia’s finalization of peaceful relations with Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan has refused to support the initiative. Thus, it is critical for Armenia to focus on a plan that Azerbaijan has agreed to: the implementation of the Aras Corridor, a transit route connecting Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan enclave through Iran. This route would bolster interregional connectivity while bypassing the political opposition that Crossroads for Peace faces, with the added security of Iranian facilitation. Moreover, the Iranian government has expressed interest in extending the Aras Corridor through Armenia and Georgia to the Black Sea, which would provide ample opportunity for Armenia to achieve Pashniyan’s goals of growth through domestic transportation infrastructure development.
Ultimately, implementing the Zangezur Corridor would severely undermine Armenia’s national security and economic stability. In contrast, the Aras Corridor’s prospects for improving regional trade without altering Armenia’s borders could bolster the Armenian economy while circumventing interest in the Zangezur corridor. Though Crossroads for Peace could further Armenia’s national interests through rules-based transportation development, it is fatally hindered by political opposition from Azerbaijan. Supporting the Aras corridor instead allows Armenia to achieve similar goals while avoiding diplomatic stonewalling, positioning the country for long-term growth.
Conclusion
The Zangezur Corridor debate is the most current of a long line of trade disputes within the South Caucasus. Following Russia and Iran’s increased tension with the West, economic independence and regional loyalty are essential to maintaining a local power balance, if not dominance on the world stage.
This roundtable is a testament to the ongoing diplomatic discussions between four regional actors, with essays in conversation with one another to represent the interests, interactions, and institutions that influence the main policy decision-making surrounding regional trade.
The Zangezur Corridor, connecting Baku to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region through Armenian territory, would provide a disproportionate benefit to Azerbaijani trade at the expense of Armenian national security and Iranian regional influence. While this would build ties with the West, the Zangezur connection would also allow increased Turkish economic participation in the region, shifting the traditional power distribution away from Iran and Russia. Consequently, the formation of the alternate Aras Corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan and Armenia through Iran, would increase Iranian involvement in local trade, establish a railroad connection to Europe and Russia, and not infringe on Armenian sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s support of the Zangezur Corridor threatens Russia’s relations with both Iran and Armenia and reflects Putin’s continued deviation from diplomatic norms.
While the debate over the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor has and will likely continue to be overshadowed by the Russo-Ukrainian War and the ongoing Iran-Israel proxy conflict, the Zangezur Corridor holds massive implications for the South Caucasus and will have long-lasting effects on the future of diplomacy among powers that rival the Western hegemonic order.
This article was edited by Alex Vilarin, Alaina Parent, and Ariana Eftimiu.