Policy 360: Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Amid an increasingly tense geopolitical landscape, the Taiwan Strait has become particularly contentious among the United States, China, and Taiwan’s neighbors. Officially the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan’s government has operated separately from mainland China since 1949. Although Beijing affirms its one-China principle, claiming Taiwan as its own, the de facto independence of the strait makes its legal status as a state ambiguous. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine raised red flags for Taiwan, igniting fear of a parallel war. Heightening hostilities between the United States and China further complicates the issue, as President Xi Jinping has adopted a more hawkish stance on reunification, and President Joe Biden has repeatedly stood firm in advocating for a free and open Indo-Pacific. This was explicit in 2022, after the visit of the former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan triggered a Chinese military demonstration near the island. The possibility of war makes the Indo-Pacific region precarious, as nations are compelled to take a stance on the situation. 

As the China-Taiwan conflict involves a number of key players, this roundtable will evaluate recent domestic and international policy shifts in Taiwan, China, the United States, the Philippines, and South Korea, as well as their reverberating implications in this volatile situation. Taiwan’s vulnerability to global superpowers and its role as a trigger point in potentially escalating conflicts leaves the Indo-Pacific region and the current geopolitical landscape highly uncertain. 

Timed-out Taiwan—The Need For Change

By Soenke Pietsch, Columbia College ’26

The Taiwan Strait is about 245 miles long and 90 miles across at its widest point, and despite its small size, has been at the center of a near century-long conflict. It has transformed into yet another geopolitical flash point in the shifting relationship between the People’s Republic of China (labeled “China”) and the United States. The open waters also symbolize the need for Taiwan to change its self-defense plans. 

Historically, Taiwan leaned on its isolation and natural defenses like its eastern mountains to shield itself from a possible Chinese invasion 90 miles away. This strategy employs the U.S. as Taiwan’s primary weapons supplier, exposing the island to the whims of the U.S. Congress as every weapons purchase necessitates the approval of American politicians. By the same token, Taiwan allows the U.S. to play a direct role in shaping its defense strategy. 

It is through this lens that many Americans are learning about the alarm bells that U.S. military planners are raising regarding Taiwan’s antiquated strategies. Historically, “strategic ambiguity” (avoiding an official position) and a “porcupine defense strategy” (building extensive, yet weak defenses) sufficed to keep a Chinese invasion at bay. However, with the coinciding development of more advanced Chinese military capabilities and a more aggressive foreign politics from Beijing, this strategy now falls short of ensuring Taiwan’s primary objectives: security and national sovereignty.

Regarding its security, Taiwan must free itself of its single source of arms procurement. In late 2023, the U.S. Congress dramatically put its infighting and division on display in selecting a House Speaker. Without a Speaker, Congress could not and did not approve sales of new weapons to allies. In the event of a Chinese invasion, Taiwan stands paralyzed by the domestic sways and political will of America—much like Ukraine today. Moreover, China’s military spending dwarfs Taiwan’s defense budget, aggravating Taiwan’s ability to acquire sufficient weapons and equipment to maintain a credible defense posture. 
Diplomatically, the rise of economic, social, and political kerfuffles within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has led diplomacy strategists to hypothesize that President Xi Jinping will lean on China’s One China principle to secure domestic stability—using war with Taiwan to overshadow China’s domestic problems, such as youth unemployment or a faltering real estate market. The result? An immense invasion. 

Taiwan’s international diplomacy is constrained by the international one-China policy, which many countries, including the U.S., adhere to as they maintain official relations with China. This policy limits Taiwan’s ability to establish diplomatic ties and engage with the international community, undermining its efforts to gain international recognition and support.

While the U.S. will remain a critical ally, Taiwan must recognize that the U.S. is actively weakening the factors that constitute America’s reliance on, and thereby support of, Taiwan. This development has most recently been evidenced by the CHIPS and Science Act, a symbol of America’s drive for self-reliance in the fields of high-tech research and semiconductor manufacturing. In response, Taiwan must embrace the proverb: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Encouraging diplomatic dialogue with its neighbors, like South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, must become an essential element of Taiwan’s foreign policy agenda in not only encircling China but also securing new supply and weapons lines, regional support, and international recognition. Though difficult, the only true avail to Taiwan’s conundrum is to establish itself as an indispensable part of the world’s economy, wherein diplomacy and dependency become Taiwan’s true aces. In doing so, Taiwan can get more out of its 245-mile-long and 90-mile-wide separation from the People’s Republic of China than just mileage.

Taiwan and the China Dream

Sarah Lerner, General Studies ’25

Tensions surge in the Taiwan Strait as Chinese military activity in the strait intensifies, even crossing the median line. The median line is the unofficial border separating Chinese and Taiwanese waters. China claims Taiwan as Chinese territory, and since the rise of former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, China has further increased political and military pressure on Taiwan. Tsai has spoken adamantly against the Chinese claim to Taiwan, and the recently-elected President Lai Ching-te has promised the continuity of Tsai’s policies, so Beijing perceives a growing threat to its control over the island. In August 2023, the United States approved the sale of advanced fighter jet sensor equipment to Taiwan, worsening anxiety in Beijing. A free, U.S.-armed Taiwan is a security threat to China given Taiwan’s proximity to Chinese shores. Chinese actions to preempt that threat, therefore, include military spending increases, attempts to extend influence into Taiwan, and the intimidation of Taiwan through military activity in the Taiwan Strait.

In this vein, Chinese President Xi Jinping is pursuing the reunification aspect of his “China Dream,” the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) goal of revitalizing what its members see as China’s former glory, in time for the 2049 hundred-year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). An independent Taiwan would preclude Beijing’s realization of this dream because reunification is a prerequisite for its achievement, making an independent Taiwan a threat to Xi’s legitimacy. Though Chinese policy toward Taiwan has historically been more of a reaction to this threat to legitimacy than active aggression and exploitation, former CIA agent John Culver predicted in a 2021 interview that Chinese aggressive behavior in the Taiwan Strait may drastically increase after 2030 to meet Xi’s 2049 reunification deadline. Chinese aggression and military activity, however, is already intensifying dramatically. Increasingly active U.S. support of Taiwan may be pushing China to change the trajectory of its Taiwan policy early, exacerbating the potential for active military conflict.

President Xi has stated outright that he blames China’s current development challenges on a perceived U.S. policy of military and economic encirclement and containment. In response, China has been expanding its military presence on its coastline facing Taiwan. Volatility in China in the wake of its economic transition to private consumption-driven growth only inflames fears of a potential U.S.-led encirclement. Thus, the more that the U.S. demonstrates its support to Taiwan, the more that Beijing feels the need to demonstrate its strength in the Taiwan Strait in response.

Chinese security concerns may also lead to attempts to accelerate the CCP’s reunification timeline. As tensions continue to rise, a more active and violent response from Beijing to exert more direct control over Taiwan and curb U.S. strength and influence so close to Chinese borders becomes increasingly likely. However, exercising caution and restraint could be beneficial to Beijing given global perceptions of Chinese military strength as a threat. A seemingly unprovoked military campaign in Taiwan could further damage prospects for international cooperation, trade, and alliance building by alienating states that already believe that Chinese military strength is dangerous. This could potentially worsen Chinese economic volatility and, as a result, weaken President Xi’s legitimacy domestically and internationally. Instead of its current strategy of intimidation by aggressive military behavior, Beijing should extend an olive branch to Taipei. Beijing’s implementation of hardline national security measures in Hong Kong in spite of promises of semi-independence have only strengthened resolve in Taiwan to resist incorporation into the PRC. Beijing should revoke its 2020 national security law in Hong Kong that functionally criminalizes any kind of opposition to the CCP as a gesture of good will to Taipei. This could facilitate good faith negotiations between Taipei and Beijing and improve Xi’s chances at peaceful reunification.

A Balancing Act: The Philippines, Taiwan, and the South China Sea

By Elizabeth Yee, Barnard College ’26

When former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2016, he sidelined disputes with Beijing over the South China Sea, reasoning that the Southeast Asian country was no match for the superpower. The Philippines has since transitioned away from this strategy of appeasement—engaging in tense confrontations with Chinese ships and forging stronger military bonds with China’s foremost adversaries, the United States and Japan. 

With President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. re-prioritizing the South China Sea, the new assertiveness in his foreign policy has impacted the Philippines’ role vis-à-vis the Taiwan Strait. While Manila maintains a One China policy—legally recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole government—and has stressed its neutrality in the U.S.-China conflict, the country has begun to shift closer to Washington, its ally against China in the South China Sea. This strategic alliance has drawn it closer to the U.S. in the Taiwan Strait conflict. 

Accelerating the pace of the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, the Philippines enabled the United States to expand its presence in the region, granting them access to four additional military bases. Three of these are located on the main island of Luzon, near Taiwan and are strategically positioned to allow the U.S. to actively respond to threats of Chinese aggression in the Strait. Indeed, the northernmost base of Camilo Osias is located just 310 miles from Taiwan’s largest industrial center. The Philippines has also ramped up other forms of coordination. In April 2023, it hosted the “Balikatan” and “Sama Sama” military exercises with the U.S., and completed joint patrols of the South China Sea—starting in the waters near Taiwan. 

China is particularly sensitive to this growing alliance, due to the Philippines’ proximity to Taiwan. In April, Beijing’s ambassador Huang Xilian accused the Philippines of “stoking the fire” of regional tensions and Taiwanese independence. Chinese state media has also claimed that the Philippines is operating as a proxy for U.S. interests in the Strait, rather than maintaining “independent foreign policy.” 

Despite this growing alliance with Washington, the Philippines must be careful to not exacerbate tensions in the Strait. With its northern islands flanking Taiwan, any form of conflict in the Strait has immediate consequences for the country. Indeed, the Philippines’ National Security Council has itself outlined that “cross-strait relations” have the “potential to be a flashpoint in the region.” Its government has expressed concerns regarding economic stability, the potential influx of refugees, its overseas population in Taiwan, and the potential for direct conflict spreading to the Luzon Strait. Thus, while allying with Washington is beneficial to its South China Sea dispute, the Philippines must remain cautious. 

Manila has a difficult task ahead: it must maintain diplomacy with China—their top trading partner—while also asserting their own territorial integrity. It must also consolidate its alliance with the U.S. to balance against the Chinese threat, simultaneously maintaining peace in Taiwan and ensuring that they retain a degree of strategic autonomy in the process. 

Although the Philippines has said it will only allow U.S. forces military access during a Taiwan conflict if it benefits its “own security,” a trend is emerging—one of enhanced ties with the U.S. and growing distance from China. While this is an effective deterrence strategy, as Marcos’ Philippines moves in this direction, it must exercise caution to avoid completely antagonizing Beijing or aggravating a regional conflict.

South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: A Litmus Test for South Korea’s Desire to Become a Global Pivotal State

By Inwoo Kim, General Studies ’25

South Korea’s handling of military tensions in the Taiwan Strait will serve as a decisive litmus test that could validate the country’s commitment to freedom and rule based order. Earlier this year, South Korea revealed its revamped Indo-Pacific Strategy with the catchphrase, “for a free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.” This was one of the first non-North Korea foreign policy blueprints presided by Yoon Suk Yeol , South Korea’s new hawkish, pro-Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance president. The new Indo-Pacific Strategy thus marks the first step in South Korea’s attempt to reposition itself as the “global pivotal state”—a key player in the increasingly chaotic world order. 
Following the creation of a new South Korean Indo-Pacific strategy, tensions have been immediately visible in the increased number of criticisms and statements exchanged by China and South Korea over its novel position in the Indo-Pacific. Last April, China issued an official diplomatic complaint over Yoon’s statement that “increased tensions around Taiwan were due to attempts to change the status quo by force.” Yoon’s statement implied that Chinese ambition over the Taiwan strait is unjustified and violates  established principles of international law. In a similar vein, Xing Haiming, China’s Ambassador to the ROK, was summoned by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs over his remarks in which he admonished South Korea against “making a wrong bet when it comes to Sino-U.S. rivalry.” China is Korea’s closest trading partner—the most significant source of both exports and imports—and still maintains a significant economic influence over South Korea’s export-reliant chemical and steel production industry that is struggling to return to pre-pandemic trade numbers. 

Over periods of strategic ambiguity in which South Korea attempted to appease both its closest military ally, the United States, and its closest trading partner, China, South Korea has faced difficulties placating both parties, and has also left a lasting impression of self-interest. In contrast to the policy of strategic ambiguity established by Yoon’s predecessor, President Moon Jae-in, the new Indo-Pacific Strategy better clarifies South Korea’s stance regarding the Taiwan Strait. Core values of freedom and peace are both emphasized. Despite these positive changes, to more properly stand up for its democratic principles and decrease China’s leverage over South Korea’s diplomatic position, the Yoon Administration must continue its efforts to diversify supply chains and search for new trading partners. In addition to creating a safety net for South Korea’s China dependent trade, South Korea must ensure that the tensions in the Taiwan Strait do not evolve into further conflict with North Korea. In a Taiwan contingency, North Korea may attempt to take advantage of the diverted U.S. forces stationed in Korea who may be relocated to engage in a conflict with China. Further investment to bolster South Korean naval and aerial military capacity—such as sustaining its research and development efforts in a new fifth generation stealth fighter jet—will decrease South Korea’s reliance on the United States and further increase South Korean leverage in the U.S.-China deadlock.

Conclusion

With the looming possibility of war in the Indo-Pacific region, the self-governing island of Taiwan is not the only one in a vulnerable position. Nonetheless, its fragile legal status limits its allies and ability to depend on the international community and its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific. The tensions in the Taiwan Strait automatically implicate the Philippines and South Korea as decisive players in deterring or escalating conflict. Taiwan’s economic and democratic prosperity is perceived as a threat to authoritarian rule in mainland China. However, China must tread lightly in its militaristic stance towards Taiwan if it wants to preserve international cooperation and trade. This is particularly true in its diplomatic relations with the United States. The U.S. adheres to a narrative of maintaining the status quo, which, in light of the current geopolitical landscape, can rapidly be upset. The polemic in the Taiwan Strait implicates immense global stakes, especially if Taiwan becomes caught in a tug of war between the U.S. and China, two nuclear superpowers.