Policy 360: Another Fallen Domino: What Niger’s Coup Means for Niger and the Rest of the World

The West and Central African region has witnessed seven military coups in the last four years. Of these seven, four affected countries are members of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), established with the aims of maintaining stability in the region. 

In July 2023, Niger became one of the most recent countries in Western Africa to witness a coup of its leadership when a military faction overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum. Niger, colonized by France in the early 1900s, has been plagued by insecurity and political instability since its independence in 1960. Although Bazoum’s election represented the first peaceful democratic transition in the country, his close association to France and corruption allegations created hostilities that led to his ousting. Among other consequences, the coups in Niger and the Sahel have impacted the livelihood and well-being of West Africans, bringing violence to the doorsteps of Nigeriens and opening the door for terrorist organizations to benefit from the instability.

This roundtable looks at five countries that are directly implicated in this issue: Niger, France the former colonial power, Russia, neighboring Nigeria, and the United States. In these pieces, our writers analyze the consequences of Niger’s coup, evaluating the actions each government has undertaken. They seek to uncover how these countries are affected by the events in Niger, what each country should be doing, and what this might mean for the rest of the Sahel region.

Evaluating the Root Causes and Implications of Niger's Coup

By Alex Vilarin, General Studies ‘25

On July 23, 2023, the democratically elected government of Niger, led by President Mohamed Bazoum, was overthrown by the Nigerien military. This event not only marked a significant turning point for Niger, but also reverberated across the global geopolitical landscape, particularly affecting American and French interests, who were among Niger’s strongest allies. Bazoum's Niger, a leading producer of uranium and one of the world's poorest nations, became the latest casualty in a series of coups that have troubled West Africa. Niger—once deemed a linchpin in the West's strategy to counter Islamic insurgencies and the growing Russian presence in the region—now stands at a critical juncture. To comprehend the coup's causes, one must delve into the challenges plaguing Niger as a nation.

Before the coup, Niger gained prominence in Western circles as a staunch ally of the French and Americans, with President Bazoum at its helm. He viewed these alliances as instrumental in combating Islamic insurgents and securing legitimacy within the nation. In the wake of coups in the Sahel, Niger stood out as one of the region's few remaining democracies, earning praise from Western nations. Consequently, the United States and France heavily invested in military bases to counter the pervasive insurgency in the arid parts of the country.

However, beneath this democratic facade, challenges loomed. According to Rahmane Idrissa, a Nigerien political scientist, "Bazoum was on an island surrounded by alligators." Despite repelling attacks more effectively than neighboring nations, security issues from insurgents were cited as the primary reason for the coup.

Complicating this, France, with a historical colonial connection to Niger, maintained a peacekeeping presence, perceived by many as overly paternalistic. This relationship was further muddled by the critical role Niger's uranium played in powering France with clean energy. Simultaneously, USAID highlighted a stark reality—only one in seven Nigeriens had access to modern electricity services, with a mere four percent of rural residents served. Post-coup, France's refusal to recognize the military junta as legitimate leaders led to the expulsion of 1,500 French soldiers and their ambassador.

The coup, however, is not synonymous with a wholesale rejection of relations with Western countries. While a significant portion of the population demonstrated discontent with the status quo through celebratory displays featuring Nigerien and Russian flags, this doesn't necessarily imply a rejection of all Western influence. Despite the expulsion of the French military, the American military retained its installations. Nevertheless, U.S. recognition of the coup forced the suspension of almost all aid due to American laws.

Thus, Niger finds itself at an inflection point. The junta, led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, has weathered challenges posed by Nigeria and other West African states threatening intervention to restore democracy. Yet, international opinion remains critical of the junta, with the UN General Assembly withholding official recognition of the leadership change. Additionally, despite internal support, political violence surged by 42 percent in the first month of military rule, contrasting prior reduction achieved with French and American assistance. The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States—comprised of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—signals a serious risk of further deteriorating security, focused on disengaging from French influence rather than countering the Islamic insurgency.

To defy the trend of its neighbors, Niger must prioritize internal security issues within its reach. The junta should channel popular energy to tackle the insurgency, which is actively killing Nigerien citizens, instead of expending energy confronting Western powers. Furthermore, outlining a clear path to democracy—contingent on specific metrics like reduced violence from insurgents—could offer ECOWAS and Western countries an opportunity to recognize the current government's legitimacy and mitigate the impact of sanctions.

Niger’s Coup and its Ramifications for France

By Lokaa Krishna, Columbia College ‘25

Coups have become more common in West Africa, as seen in Burkina Faso’s army ousting of President Roch Kabore in 2022, to Chad’s army taking power after President Idriss Deby was killed in 2021. Several coups are driven by resistance and hostility toward the French: on July 30, 2023, after the military coup in Niger, army supporters ripped off and stamped on a plaque containing the words “Embassy of France in Niger.” 

Hostility towards France has historical roots, given France’s colonization of West Africa in the early 20th century. Despite Niger achieving independence after World War II, French influence has lingered through its Francafrique tradition, a neocolonial network in the region characterized by political, security, and economic relationships hinging upon French cultural values. France’s oppressive policies in Niger have extended into its postcolonial period: France has established neo-colonial rule and political systems purposed toward extraction of valuable resources, resistance toward terrorism, and an enduring presence in Niger’s local politics even after independence. Recently, anti-French hostility has risen in Niger as France deployed 3,000 troops to fight terror groups in the Sahel, specifically from existing holdings in Niger and Chad. The criticism these troops received reflect a growing sentiment in West Africa that France had “disowned universal moral values.” Furthermore, despite commitments from Emmanuel Macron to diminish French presence in Niger, the CFA Franc, a currency attached to the Euro and insured by France, persists, and is referred to as “monetary servitude.” 

Still, France is determined to maintain a foothold in Niger, including through military intervention alongside the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a West African political union perceived by some as a French pawn. Additionally, President Mohamed Bazum, the ousted leader of Niger, was targeted as a “puppet” representing French interests, depicting how not only organizations within Niger such as ECOWAS, but its leaders too have succumbed to French interest. 

Although France has been forced out of the area by a myriad of other coups, Niger is particularly essential to France, especially as one of France’s three largest uranium suppliers. Without Niger, France’s Africa policy will be dismantled, and Europe will be faced with a wholly new threat as terrorists could gain free reign in the region, with dramatic consequences for migration routes. There are also some international consequences France must consider. Some Nigeriens may welcome Russian influence as an alternative to French neo-colonial interests, as evidenced by the  waving of Russian flags after the coup. 

To ensure a positive relationship with Niger is maintained, while mitigating the threat of terrorism for Europe, France should continue to fight against terrorist organizations in Niger without imposing its Francafrique tradition and employing oppressive means of control. France needs to work with the new government of Niger in order to prevent the dissipation of security in the Sahel and instability that would spur a humanitarian crisis such as the migrant crisis of 2015 and 2016. All action, though, should be done with the understanding that if people of Niger perceive said action as neo-colonialism, it will be unpopular and consequently unsuccessful. Therefore, France should be mindful to avoid great intervention within local politics, such as creating “puppets” within the local government, step back from cultural and political intervention, and refrain from the exploitation of local resources. This approach is the only solution for French and Nigerien cooperation, and the consequent prevention of greater crises.

Russia in Africa: A Precarious Future for its Military Influence? 

By Luc Hillion, General Studies ‘24

On March 31, 2023, Malian armed forces and unidentified white foreign soldiers departed the town of Moura following a joint anti-terror operation. While Malian authorities deemed the operation successful—claiming to have eliminated 203 terrorists—they ignored any mention of civilian casualties: 300–500 massacred. In a U.N. human rights report, survivors recounted harrowing tales of summary executions, rape, and torture. The involvement of white foreign soldiers—allegedly members of the Russian Wagner Private Military Company (P.M.C.)—further substantiated Wagner’s already brutal reputation in Africa, established with operations in Syria and Libya in 2015 and 2018, respectively.

As demonstrated by the fact that the Moura operation occurred in the aftermath of the French withdrawal of counterinsurgency forces, Russia struggles to competently replace Western anti-terrorist operations in the Sahel. Therefore, following Niger’s recent coup, Russia has little military influence to gain in the region. 

After the President of Niger’s removal from power, protestors in the streets of Niamey brandished Russian flags. Media footage caught sight of protestors with signs reading “Down with France, long live Putin.” Such pro-Russian sentiments stem from Russia’s adeptness at information warfare. It regularly uses targeted social media campaigns to amplify anti-French sentiments spurred by national adversity to France’s colonial past. In Niger’s case, one month after the coup, online activity about Niger increased by 6,645% across 45 Russian and Wagnerian Telegram Messenger channels.

After replacing French military influence in Mali and the Central African Republic, Russia positioned itself as an alternative power in Africa, and a liberator amid rising anti-western feelings. For example, when Niger faced the threat of invasion from ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the head of Niger’s junta asked Wagner for military assistance.

Despite the proclivity of some anti-western governments in Africa to seek Russian mercenaries to secure their grip on power, Russia’s potential gains in the region remain uncertain. Following the protracted nature of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the state lacks the military capacity to spare valuable mercenaries to expend in offensives. For example, in the capture of the city of Bakhmut, Wagner suffered the loss of 20,000 men killed, as reported by its former chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin. These heavy casualties, coupled with tensions between the P.M.C.’s semi-autonomous structure and the Russian Ministry of Defense, sparked a failed rebellion in June of 2023. With the death of Wagner’s charismatic chief under nebulous circumstances and Wagner’s extensive employment in Ukraine, Russia’s future ability to use mercenary groups as an instrument of its foreign policy remains precarious.

Given the prolonged and challenging nature of Western counterinsurgency campaigns, like in Afghanistan and Mali, it is plausible that Russia would prefer to avoid engaging in similar endeavors. Russia possesses neither the military capacity expended in Ukraine nor the economy, which appears uncertain as it increased its defense budget to match a third of its G.D.P.

Additionally, as the Russian state tightens its grip on mercenary groups, Russian P.M.C.s lose the allure they once held—their autonomy. Consequently, with diminishing operational autonomy for Russian mercenaries, African nations may find collaborating with the U.S. or China more fruitful and straightforward than liaising with the Kremlin.

Considering Russia’s depreciating military capabilities, Russia should pivot towards expanding its economic influence in the Sahel, especially as France’s influence wanes. To capitalize on this opportunity, it could forge new economic partnerships by brokering grain deals with nations like Niger and trading commodities for valuable metals and minerals. Amidst reduced Ukrainian grain exports caused by Russia’s invasion, Russia becomes an attractive option for African nations to satisfy their unsatiated demand for grain. 

Niger’s Coup: Does It Mean Calamity for Nigeria?

By Moya Linsey, Barnard College ‘25

For years, Niger and Nigeria have been natural allies. Their people share cultural similarities, and the two nations share a border that stretches for more than a thousand kilometers. Historically, Niger and Nigeria have worked together to combat terrorism and transnational threats. The July 2023 coup in Niger by General Abdoulrahamane Tchiani, however, threatens to weaken this relationship, allowing terrorist groups to recoup territory and reinvigorate their organizations across the two countries. 

Just hours after Tchiani overthrew President Mohammed Bazoum, Nigeria hosted a meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to condemn the coup. Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, who also chairs ECOWAS, released a statement saying “We will not accept coup after coup in West Africa again”—a response to the growing trend of military takeover in the region, where four countries have experienced coups in the past three years. ECOWAS also activated their own standby forces and proposed military intervention. This decision was largely seen as President Tinubu’s, as he is the chair of the group and Nigeria is its most powerful member. In fact, the Nigerian government went even further, shutting down its border with Niger, cutting off its electricity supply—a critical blow to the military junta, as 70 percent of Niger’s electricity is imported from Nigeria. 

As a result of this lack of cooperation, transnational efforts to combat terrorism will be endangered. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s (IEP) Global Terrorism 2023 Index, Niger is ranked as the 10th country most impacted by terrorism, while Nigeria is ranked 8th. However, the Institute also found that in 2022, both Niger and Nigeria reduced the number of deaths caused by terrorism, undoubtedly due in part to the two states’ shared commitment to battling Boko Haram and the Islamic State. Past multilateral, counterterrorist initiatives have included the Nigerian-led Multinational Task Force and the regional G5 Sahel joint force.

The International Centre for Counterterrorism indeed argues that the coup, and subsequent deterioration of Nigerien relations with Nigeria and ECOWAS, will allow terrorist organizations to advance across the Sahel, ultimately crossing over to northern Nigeria. Without economic assistance from ECOWAS and the military partnership of Nigeria, it is probable that Niger, alone and vulnerable, could become a safe-haven for terror cells and training camps. If Nigeria wants to avoid this outcome, then the Nigerian government should reconsider the severity of its sanctions regime. Between the closing of Niger’s border with Nigeria and the ECOWAS sanctions—which include the suspension of commercial business with Niger, the freezing of Niamey’s state assets in the regional bank and commercial banks, and the pause in financial aid from development banks—the Nigerien people have been unduly impacted by sanctions meant to punish the government. Such economic instability can be easily taken advantage of by terrorist organizations, who use the insecurity to conceal and plan attacks.

However, it is also not entirely out of the question that the opposite could occur—military regimes do have some advantages. As a political scientist at Korea University, Nam Kyu Kim (2020) noted, territorial threats such as terrorism “make the military more internally unified and cohesive, which helps the military rule as an institution.” Perhaps, a growing danger of terrorism will force Niger’s military regime to improve and expand its security and peacekeeping efforts. However, that could result in negative ramifications for neighboring Nigeria, as Boko Haram and the Islamic State are pushed out of Niger and into fellow Sahel states. Regardless of the internal consequences of Niger’s coup, it is likely that the new military regime will prevent Nigeria’s progress in combating terrorism, especially if the Nigerian government insists on punishing Niger so drastically.

Military Bases in Niger: How the U.S. Can Resist the Coup

By Claire Thornhill, Columbia College ‘27

When a military junta took over Niger’s government in July, the impact was intercontinental. Niger is the United States’ most important military hub in West Africa, allowing the U.S. to help combat terrorism in the region. Due to the presence of key military bases in Niger, the U.S. was immediately affected by the takeover of the Nigerien capital of Niamey, which led the U.S. to move its 1,100 troops from Niamey to Agadez, about 920 kilometers away. 

After holding out in hopes of a return to the original democratically elected government, in October, the U.S. State Department finally acknowledged that the military takeover was a coup. This resulted in the suspension of nearly $200 million in U.S. assistance to Niger. In doing so, the U.S. has signaled to Niger—and the rest of the world—that it does not recognize the junta as Niger’s legitimate government. Fund suspension could diminish the United States’ power in the country by weakening its influence over the Nigerien government’s decisions. This could encourage other world powers such as Russia and China to become more involved in the country. Niger’s junta has reportedly already reached out to a Moscow paramilitary group for more military support. Thus, the U.S. should reorient its policy as to not encourage further ties between Niger and anti-democratic influences.

Although its military presence has been largely affected by the coup, the U.S. only has so much leverage over decisions that concern the protection of the democratic government. One of the U.S.’ greatest advantages in defending their interests in Nigerien politics is monetary support, due to the U.S.' ability to dictate Niger’s military and humanitarian capabilities through this funding. 

The Consolidated Appropriations Act passed earlier this year only generated more inconsistencies in how the U.S. helps countries dealing with governmental takeovers, specifically by introducing the idea of a discretionary waiver. The possibility of the waiver being granted to Niger’s junta could allow U.S. figures to ignore the coup’s great impact on the U.S.’ military power in Niger. Past attempts at maintaining U.S. interests following coups indicate that granting a waiver would likely not end well; in 2013, the Obama administration chose not to recognize the coup in Egypt, which allowed military aid to continue to flow into the country. However, Egypt made no strides towards humanitarian or human rights goals as a result of the U.S.’ funding. Egyptian citizens targeting Indigenous peoples, journalists, Islamists, and LGBTQ+ Egyptians demonstrates that the U.S.’ continued involvement has made relatively no impact on human rights. Niger and Egypt’s similar locations and relations with the U.S. before the coup support that if the U.S. grants Niger a waiver for more military support, it could lead to increased targeting of vulnerable groups. This would resemble what occurred in Egypt after continued U.S. support following their coup. 

Currently, the U.S. is planning not to extend a waiver to Niger under the Consolidated Appropriations Act. This is the best course of action, as withholding military assistance does not require the U.S. to withhold humanitarian aid, allowing for the U.S. to continue supporting the people of Niger without extending support to the coup’s leadership. 

Although the U.S. may not back Niger’s military, maintaining a relationship with Nigeriens will ensure the U.S.’ support for human rights, and maintain its influence in the region. The pull of monetary military assistance is necessary, but this should not stop the U.S. from fulfilling other duties and maintaining a positive relationship.

Conclusion

The political situation in Niger illustrates the interconnection of the global community. Joining several other Western African nations in recent years, Niger is merely 1 of 18 countries since 2017 that have been plagued by coups. Despite attempts at stabilizing the region through organizations like ECOWAS, actions condemning the coup by neighboring countries like Nigeria, and responses by foreign governments like France, Russia, and the United States, the path forward in light of the junta’s ascension to power is still unclear for many countries. 

Even more concerning, the threat of coups in Western Africa has not dissipated since the events in Niger in July. In November, the government of Sierra Leone reported a failed coup attempt that released 2,000 prisoners and resulted in the death of 20 individuals. The failure to reverse the actions of the military junta in Niger, along with the other recent coups in the area, encourages military groups in nearby countries to follow suit and spread coup attempts like wildfire.

As we have seen, it is a country’s constituents who bear the burden of consequences from political instability. In Niger, political violence continues on an upward trend. The U.S. must weigh its decisions in regard to Niger’s junta with its ability to provide Nigeriens humanitarian aid. Previously, supposed Russian military actions in the region have led to the deaths of hundreds of civilians, and France and Nigeria’s interest in stability reflect the concerns about the development of terrorist organizations in West Africa, where political instability allows these cells to grow and pose a threat to civilians worldwide. Niger and other countries with ties to Niger must decide their actions carefully with a clear goal of protecting the citizens of Niger and the rest of the world.