Kristi Noem, former Secretary of Homeland Security, attempted to terminate 13 of the 17 existing Temporary Protected Status designations, leading to lengthy litigation on Secretary Noem’s procedural missteps. Photo Courtesy of Gage Skidmore.
In 2011, Syria erupted into civil war between President Bashar Al-Assad’s authoritarian regime and a fractured opposition, taking over 580,000 lives while displacing more than 13 million Syrians between 2011 and 2024. In response, America designated “Temporary Protected Status,” or TPS, to Syria. Created in the Immigration Act of 1990, TPS is a temporary designation to countries that are deemed unsafe for nationals in the US to return to. The Secretary of Homeland Security grants these designations for reasons including war, natural disasters, and other extraordinary circumstances. TPS beneficiaries, after applying and passing a background check, can reside and work in the US, and cannot be removed during the designation period.
Though TPS was intended to be temporary, many designations have lasted for decades. For example, Syria was designated TPS in 2012 and a series of extensions maintained the country's status for over a decade. As of March 2025, approximately 1.3 million individuals from 17 different countries benefited from TPS; however, following broader policies restricting immigration, the Trump administration has attempted to terminate 13 of the 17 TPS designations.
In September of 2025, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem terminated Syria’s designation, giving 60 days notice to the 6,100 Syrian TPS holders in the US that they could not legally remain in the country. A portion of these Syrians sued in the Southern District of New York in Doe v. Noem, arguing that the termination was arbitrary because required procedural steps weren’t followed. In late 2025, a US district court ruled that Secretary Noem likely violated the TPS statute by not adequately consulting appropriate agencies as required in Section 3a of 8 U.S. Code § 1254a:
The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, shall review the conditions in the foreign state. . .for which a designation is in effect. [...] and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation [...] continue to be met.
Though the act does not list specific agencies that are deemed “appropriate”, past termination procedures have typically included the Department of State, the National Security Council, and occasionally the Department of Justice. These agencies can inform the Secretary about the conditions in countries designated for TPS and whether it would be advisable to terminate or redesignate TPS. The government appealed the district court’s decision to the US Supreme Court, where it was consolidated with a similar case challenging Haiti’s TPS termination (Miot v. Trump), and titled Mullin v. Doe, et al. On June 25th in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the termination of both Syria’s and Haiti’s TPS.
This decision gives undue discretion over TPS designations to the executive branch and continues a trend of eroding the power of the judicial branch to provide constitutional checks on executive authority; furthermore, it allows for abuse of the TPS system, evidenced by the violation of Syria's TPS termination process and the country’s continually unsafe conditions.
The primary question in Mullin v. Doe concerned the availability of judicial review of non-constitutional decisions made by DHS in a TPS termination. The Supreme Court ultimately barred itself from reviewing any TPS designations and terminations, including procedural steps that precede them. The decision hinged on the meaning of the word “determine.” As Justice Alito writes in the majority opinion, “The relevant provision bars judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary of Homeland Security] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state.” Justice Alito, alongside the Court’s conservative majority, interprets “determine” as referring to the authority to make terminations, designations, and any related procedural steps taken—“procedural determinations.” Justice Elena Kagan dissented, asserting that “determine” more accurately refers to the final decisions (specifically, designations and terminations) and not the process.
Indeed, Justice Alito’s interpretation of “determine” seems to undermine court precedent. In the 1991 case McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, the Court held that statutory and constitutional challenges to procedures used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Special Agricultural Worker program were reviewable. The Court drew a distinction between legal challenges to an individual decision and challenges to the process by which that decision was made. Mullin v. Doe establishes a new precedent that places TP procedural determinations beyond judicial review and leaves them to the Secretary of Homeland Security, leaving the TPS program vulnerable to political whims of the executive branch.
Although only 6,000 Syrian nationals reside in the US under TPS, analyzing Syria’s termination process can expose the possible consequences of DHS’s procedural missteps.
First, Secretary Noem did not take the necessary procedural steps required by the TPS statute to terminate Syria’s TPS. Her sole form of “consultation” with relevant agencies (as required by the statute) consisted of a single email to the State Department stating that Haiti and Syria were up for TPS review, to which the department responded that it had “no foreign policy concerns.” She did consult with the National Security Council or Department of Justice, and her communication with the State Department lacked any discussion of the country's conditions. Though she was caught, the termination was upheld because the Court deemed procedural determinations as unreviewable. Such failures of procedure will continue to be exempt from review, creating a harmful precedent that allows for abuse of TPS.
This abuse could have far-reaching consequences, as a Secretary of Homeland Security could terminate a TPS designation for a country that remains unsafe. Syria can again be used as an example. DHS termination report on Syria’s TPS had its foundations in the 2024 overthrow of the Assad regime, which was followed by a transitional government under Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Though a termination report is a required part of the TPS termination process, the report’s justifications are flawed, perhaps due to a lack of consultation with government agencies.
The report uses two main pieces of evidence to support the termination:
First, DHS cites the 1.2 million Syrian refugees who’ve returned to the country after Assad’s overthrow; however, this return was primarily driven by “push” rather than “pull” factors. In Lebanon, where 1.3 million Syrian refugees reside, over 90%live in extreme poverty and face frequent deportations. In Turkey, which hosts 3.2 million Syrian refugees, 90% are unable to cover monthly expenses. Worse, Turkey has growing anti-Syrian refugee sentiment, and Human Rights Watch has documented many Syrians being coerced into signing “voluntary return” contracts. In the European Union, where 1.4 million Syrian refugees reside, many member states have suspended asylum processing and revoked protection status for Syrians. DHS’s use of refugee return statistics fails to account for clear evidence suggesting that the return of the refugees has little to do with conditions in Syria.
The second justification made by DHS concerns decreasing violence, claiming that the sporadic nature of violence in Syria fails to pose a serious threat to returning Syrians. While violence in Syria doesn’t continue at the same severity as during the Civil War, it remains serious. Syria’s transitional government identifies as Sunni, but substantial Kurdish, Druze, and Alawite populations reside throughout the nation. In 2025, Al-Sharaa’s transitional government committed violent abuses against these minority populations, including sexual violence against Druze communities and identity-based killings of Alawites. Terminating TPS would put thousands more lives at risk, increasing minority displacement. Until the transitional government integrates minority communities into the government, safety is far from ensured for Syrians.
DHS claims further undermine realities for both minority and majority Syrians. Almost 70%of the population requires humanitarian assistance, a heavily rationed electric system limits electricity, and over 80%of Syrian families cannot meet their food needs; furthermore, 15.4 million Syrians are at risk of injury or death due to unexploded ordnance.
Ultimately, conditions in Syria are unsafe for Syrian TPS holders to return to. DHS’s disregard for such conditions shows how consequential an abuse of TPS terminations could be—abuse that was permitted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The termination of Syria’s TPS could impact the U.S. relationship with Syria. As Syria continues to transition under Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s government, the country could be an important situational ally of the U.S. in Middle Eastern conflicts. Though one could view terminating TPS as a sign of trust, forcefully deporting 6,100 Syrian nationals could increase pressure on the fledgling administration; furthermore, the termination would signify an American disinterest in intervening in the Middle East, a harmful narrative for U.S. efforts in the region.
What would hypothetically follow Mullin v. Doe is frightening: countries still unsafe for nationals to return to could have their TPS designations terminated for domestic political reasons without procedural safeguards. In light of Syria’s unjustified TPS termination, it is plausible that the Trump administration’s other TPS terminations are similarly flawed. The consequences are drastic: up to 1.3 million people living and working in the U.S. for decades could be sent back to countries that remain unsafe and be put at risk of poverty and violence.
One way to account for the harmful impact of Mullin v. Doe is for Congress to amend the TPS statute to specify that procedural determinations remain reviewable, followed by the establishment of a more concrete termination and designation procedure. For instance, this could include a mandated consultation with the State Department that includes preset questions directly addressing country conditions. This would allow for TPS abuse to be investigated and addressed in federal courts.
On a broader level, the TPS system needs reform to include more comprehensive positive liberties. As designations have often lasted decades, the program has become less “temporary”; policymakers should consider providing TPS holders who have resided and worked in the U.S. for many years with a path to U.S. citizenship. Additionally, many countries granted TPS have been ravaged by war and natural disasters—provisions should be created to guarantee safe housing and food access for TPS holders in their home countries after a termination.
TPS can be an effective way for the U.S. to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals from struggling countries, but these loopholes within the law leave the system vulnerable to unjustified terminations for the sake of political expediency. Until they are addressed, the potential for terrible injustice to TPS holders remains.
Roshan Hoban (CC ‘30) is an incoming freshman studying Economics-Political Science. He can be reached at rgh2137@columbia.edu.