Policy 360: The Struggle for Democracy Across East and Southeast Asia

Since 2019, pro-democracy protests have spread like wildfire across East and Southeast Asia. These protests started in Hong Kong following China’s crackdown, and resulted in the consequent erosion of Hong Kong’s political autonomy and democratic freedoms. In anticipating robust political reform that would grant citizens more political rights and civil liberties, people took to the streets. Despite the movement’s lack of success in tangibly resisting China’s autocratic rule, they received tremendous international recognition and support not only from other democratic countries around the world, but also from countries facing similar struggles in the surrounding region. Hong Kong, Thailand, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Taiwan, to name a few, saw the rise of pro-democracy protests that called for the restoration of democracy, signaling a strong desire for change. Following years of repressive rule and motivated by the apprehension of exacerbating democratic erosion, citizens pushed to reclaim their civil liberties and political rights. Pro-democracy protesters desire to establish a system of government that would be initiated through competitive, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage, and would protect each individual’s civil liberties by holding elected representatives accountable. 

This roundtable seeks to explore the different ways in which, and reasons why, pro-democracy protests emerged in Thailand, Myanmar, Hong Kong, and the Philippines. By providing an analysis of the differing historical contexts within each of these countries, this roundtable explores the ways in which culture, history, religion, and state forms have played a role in shaping the repressive regimes that have existed in these countries or regions. It also draws parallels between the countries and provides explanations for why the pro-democracy protests emerged, and how governments have responded to these pro-democracy protests either by suppressing the demands of protestors or by reflecting these calls for democratic change in their state policy. By analyzing the perspectives of four different countries, this piece allows readers to better understand the reasons for the latest wave in pro-democracy protests in East and Southeast Asia.

Protecting the Promise of Self-Rule in Hong Kong

By Adam Rowan, Columbia College ‘24

LIBERATE HONG KONG, REVOLUTION OF OUR TIMES,” read the flag on the back of protestor Tong Yong-Kit’s motorcycle as he collided with police amid the 2020 protests featuring pro-democracy mobilizers, most of which were instigated by a 2019 Chinese proposal to amend Hong Kong extradition laws and the 2020 National Security Law. He was later found guilty of terrorism and inciting secession by the Chinese government.

Tensions between mainland China and Hong Kong have existed since the 1997 transfer of Hong Kong from the British government to the Chinese Communist Party. This transfer began the “one country, two systems” policy of democratic self-rule in Hong Kong, making it largely autonomous from Beijing. Yet, Beijing’s exertion of control over the region through various means has increased over time. When the government proposed legislation in 2019 that would allow extradition of criminals to the mainland, millions took to the streets to protest. The next year, China enacted the infamous National Security Law, which made a broad range of actions illegal in the interest of national security. The Chinese government has thereafter continued to tighten its grip on democratic liberties, indicating dire future consequences for Hong Kongers if China continues to impose its will. 

Chinese actions have resulted in problems for Hong Kong’s status as a global financial hub. Because of China’s actions and as a result of the global pandemic, companies have begun to leave Hong Kong and some have looked to establish presences in other cities in the East and Southeast Asian region. Furthermore, Hong Kong’s reputation on the international stage has fallen as leaders like the former U.S. President Trump retracted some of Hong Kong’s trade privileges in response to the situation. 

The government’s actions against the people of Hong Kong have led some citizens to feel as though the cost of protesting is too high, causing protesters to worry that lower turnout and emigration consideration indicate a losing sentiment. However, beliefs in democratic values are still widely held among the people; citizens have not lost their desire and drive to fight, something which seems will continue for generations. 

To successfully continue this fight, Hong Kongers should examine the organization of pro-democracy protests in the past. One reason the 2014 protests resulted in no concessions from Beijing was disagreement amongst protestors on their goals; major activists and leaders of pro-democracy groups must work together to determine which freedoms they want to fight for, how to spread their message, and what resolution(s) they will accept. To succeed, the people of Hong Kong must also understand Beijing’s perspective. Hong Kong is an important financial center and brings economic benefits to Beijing; as the economic status of Hong Kong is lowered on the international stage, China will lose these benefits as well. The people of Hong Kong must articulate to China that increased control will hurt the mainland’s economic situation. Furthermore, the protesters must signal that they will not oppose China’s form of government in other parts of the country so as not to appear threatening to the mainland. Forming a united body with an agreed-upon platform and strategy for protesting, potentially through meetings with important Hong Kong protestors and stakeholders, will give Hong Kongers the negotiating power to reason with Beijing and to threaten action if their demands are not met. 

The success of the pro-democracy movement is important for protecting Hong Kongers’ democratic right to self-rule which was granted under the “one-country, two systems” policy, but it can also have positive effects on the rest of East and Southeast Asia. Already, Hong Kong’s protests have inspired activists in Myanmar to use digital tools to aid in protesting. This indicates that the outcome of one movement may be influential to outcomes of protests in other countries. A triumphant Hong Kong against mainland China could inspire hope and encourage the success of nearby movements in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and beyond.

At The Crossroads of Democracy: Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

By Aleka Gomez-Sotomayor-Roel, Columbia College ‘25

A coup d’état executed on February 1, 2021, in which democratically elected leaders of Myanmar’s ruling party were deposed by the military, reinstated authoritarian rule following years of quasi-democracy. This pivotal event crushed hopes for democratic progress in a Southeast Asian country plagued by decades of ethnic conflict and repressive regimes. 

After elections in 2021 gave the National League for Democracy (NLD) a substantial lead, the Tatmadaw, or military, refused to accept the seemingly fraudulent results. Under the established system, they feared their authority would be curtailed and crushed Myanmar’s nascent democracy to safeguard its power. Following the coup, massive protests erupted nationwide in a movement known locally as the Spring Revolution, with demonstrators calling for a restoration of democratic rule. As Myanmar’s junta violently cracked down on protestors, hoping to terrorize the population into submission, protesters responded by taking up arms against the regime and using social media to garner nationwide support. While initially peaceful, protests turned violent as activists realized that traditional forms of resistance, including labor strikes and boycott campaigns, were no match to the Tatmadaw’s brutality. In what can only be characterized as a cycle of violence that has afflicted Myanmar for its recent past, the military’s brutal tactics were condemned by the United Nations, foreign leaders, and human rights organizations. The violence was not only isolated to Myanmar’s ethnic-majority borders, but also occurred in major cities, leading thousands to seek refuge in neighboring India and Thailand. 

As the fight continues in a country facing both internal and external pressures, it remains to be seen how Myanmar will rebuild its future. 

Throughout its turbulent history, Myanmar has struggled with military rule, religious turmoil, and poor governance; the 2021 coup marked a new chapter in its history. Although the country’s democratization prior to the coup excluded many ethnic and religious minorities, it nonetheless brought political rights and economic opportunities to a large sector of the Burmese population. The military coup thus signifies a regression to a past where none of these liberties existed.

A failed democratic uprising in the late 20tth century set the stage for Myanmar’s current political struggles, paving the way for future democratic governance. The 1988 upheaval not only established the military junta that would influence political affairs for the next several decades, but also instilled a democratic fervor that would eventually bring the NLD, and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, to power. Under her rule, the military exercised substantial power, leading many to question whether the failure to challenge their authority laid the groundwork for the subsequent coup. 

A new generation of resistance in Myanmar can thus draw striking parallels between the current and historical episodes of military overthrow and ensuing civil upheaval. Will it be any different this time? 

Civilian struggle against oppressive dictators has been a defining symbol of Burmese society. For protestors, there is a lot at stake in their resistance—it signifies hope for a new future in Myanmar. The 2021 coup d’état, like previous struggles in Myanmar’s history, sheds light on the tumultuous relationship between civilian leadership and military rule, and marks the end of Myanmar’s fragile push towards democracy over the last decade. In a country divided along ethnic lines, widespread resistance to the military junta allows the population to find common ground. The Spring Revolution represents not only a civil movement, but, most importantly, it calls for a regime change and a reimagining of politics as both inclusive and cross-ethnic, and free from the yoke of military domination. 

Embroiled in a humanitarian crisis that goes beyond Burmese borders, it remains to be seen how Myanmar will cope with the political, economic, and social challenges that lie ahead.

Marcos Jr. Rewrites History and Leaves Democracy Hanging in the Balance

Isha Banerjee, Columbia College ‘26

The Philippines has long been known as Asia’s undemocratic democracy. Due to the long-standing history of the newly elected leaders in May of 2022, the Philippines is on the brink of returning to a dictatorship. As the country’s democracy hangs in the balance, protesters have taken to the streets to protect and fight for their civil and political rights by calling for a change in leadership. 

Bongbong Marcos Jr., Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s son, ran against former Vice President Leni Robredo in a crucial election. Marcos Jr. has described his father as a “genius,” and many of his supporters believe that the dictatorship was a “golden age” for the Philippines. Despite Leni Robredo obtaining substantial public support from young voters, Marcos Jr. won with a landslide victory, which has awakened a fear among many Phillipinos that the darkest period of their country’s political history is repeating itself in 2022. 

Political scientists cautioned that the victory of the Marcoses was to be expected due to the public’s gradual loss of faith in democracy and the success of his social media campaign. Marcos chose to run his campaign through social media, using it to publicly criticize his opponent, by framing Robredo’s campaign promise of democracy as a false mirage. For people who did not know much about the history of the Marcos regime, Marcos was able to flood their phones, through social media, with misinformation and conspiracy theories which made it difficult for fact checkers to report all of the instances of misinformation.

After the results, hundreds of protesters flooded the streets holding signs that said “say no to electoral fraud.” These protesters, who are mostly students, believed that Marcos’ campaign was fraudulent because of misinformation. Despite some malfunctioning voting machines, experts believe that the prediction of Marcos’ sweeping victory suggests that there is not enough evidence to claim fraud. 

Claims that Marcos supporters were misinformed were not uniformly popular, as it reaffirmed the idea that Robredo supporters are elitists for thinking that Marcos supporters are unable to form their own opinions. Marcos’ unexpected win in the Philippines illustrates that the loudest, most public voices, are often not the ones that decide the results of the election. Reaching voters through social media in a clandestine way because of the lack of fact-checking resulted in a surge of pro-Marcos votes. The role of social media, an often unpoliced means of communications, has a significant impact on misinformation campaigns which has real implications for elections. 

The Philippines is the oldest and most established democracy of Southeast Asia and hence, while citizens of other Southeast Asian countries are fighting for a democracy, Phillipinos are in a battle to protect it. Observers argued that authoritarian leaders around the world are watching Marcos’ victory in the election and his endeavor to rewrite history. 

As we watch the oldest democracy in the region fight for its legitimacy, we can’t help but wonder what this will signal for the pro-democracy struggle in the neighboring countries that continue to battle for their civil liberties. 

The Crown Militant: The Precarity of Democracy in Thailand and the Militarist-Monarchist Alliance

Steven Long, Columbia College ‘24

The promise of democracy has collapsed in Thailand. Still reeling from a series of brutally repressed protests throughout 2020 and 2021 and a sham election in 2019, progressive elements in the Southeast Asian country remain on the backfoot. Since ascending to the throne in 2016, King Maha Vajiralongkorn has embarked on an authoritarian political project, an important motivation for the reaction of pro-democracy protests. 

More than two years have passed since the start of these pro-democratic demonstrations, and setbacks still abound for the would-be reformers. In September 2022, Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha was allowed to stay in office, despite holding the same position since 2014’s military-lead coup, and thus exceeding the constitution’s eight-year term limit. This result is unsurprising, especially considering that even if Chan-o-cha were to step down, another replacement drawn from military ranks would likely take his place.

It is surprising though, that demonstrations against this ruling largely failed to materialize, against the expectations of commenters at the respected think tank Council on Foreign Relations. In fact, the largest protest drew only around five hundred people, a far cry from the tens of thousands that gathered years ago, under the shadow of a global pandemic. Motivated by a recent rebound in the country’s economic fortunes, previously vigorous calls for democracy have largely faded away into grudging acceptance of the military-led status quo. Thailand remains a deeply flawed democracy, with the Economist Intelligence Unit giving it a score of 6.04 on the democracy index, only 0.04 away from the cutoff for a “hybrid regime.” The question is no longer whether full democracy may yet come to Thailand, but whether the movement itself can stay alive.

The politics of Thailand are largely made up of three main stakeholders: the military and their conservative supporters, the royals, and progressive elements made up of students, youth, workers, and many other citizens interested in establishing a functioning democracy. Since the coup of 2014, the King and the military have sustained an authoritarian government that routinely abuses its power. These two factions have largely locked out any reformist elements from positions of power, preventing democratic reform of any kind. 

In other Southeast Asian countries, military juntas also reign over populations calling for democracy. A comparative situation exists in Myanmar, where the military has held power since a coup in 2021 that unseated a democratically-elected government. But beyond a surface-level parallel in military control, the situation in Thailand differs substantially. Unlike in Myanmar, Thai activists have not managed to carry through sufficient momentum past protests in 2020 and 2021, partially due to Thailand’s unique power-sharing agreement between the royal family and the military. This military-monarchist alliance is key to understanding the authoritarian stranglehold on the politics of Thailand.

Both factions of this alliance use the tools of state to suppress the pro-democracy movement in Thailand. That is, while the military uses violent tactics to suppress protests, the monarchy employs some of “the world’s harshest lese majeste laws” to silence and jail the government’s critics. In this way, these two conservative stakeholders further each other’s interests while the progressives weaken in the face of apathy, disintegration, and suppression.

It was not always like this. While Thailand’s military has always been embroiled in authoritarian tendencies and overt corruption, the monarchy shied away from such inclinations at one point. In 2005, in what was seen as the herald of a new era of reform, the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej had given a speech in support of democratic ideals. The herald of authoritarianism was then-Prince Vajiralongkorn, trailing a long series of scandals and questionable political opinions.

If the military-monarchy alliance is the key to understanding Thailand’s current predicament, then one of these factions must also become the key to solving it as well. The student-led protests of 2020 and 2021 remain at a standstill, and nothing barring another global pandemic seems to be able to invigorate this movement again. But as those protests showed, public opinion has not underlined support for the King Vajiralongkorn’s reign, featuring discontent within Prime Minister Chan-o-cha’s own faction. To save the institution of the monarchy, the King himself will have to come to reckon with this conflict. In the meantime, the democratic movement in Thailand must seek to stay alive despite an increasingly bleak outlook. After all, even if King Vajiralongkorn continues to resist reforms, there’s always another king.

Conclusion

Southeast Asia has not been immune from the general backsliding towards autocracy that has been observed throughout the globe over the last several years. Relying on a combination of repressive legal instruments, such as Hong Kong’s China-imposed National Security Law and Thailand’s lesée majesté laws, as well as a strong dose of brutal violent repression from security forces, autocratic states in the East and Southeast Asian region have destabilized pro-democracy movements. Moreover, democratic institutions have been threatened in the Philippines and crushed in Hong Kong. 

Despite these concerning developments, the very formation and sustaining of pro-democracy movements in these states is a cause for optimism. Existing interactions and formal links with protestors’ like-minded counterparts in neighboring states may help to further challenge state repression. In Myanmar, as we have seen, extraordinary levels of violent repression have proven insufficient for the suppression of the powerful pro-democracy mobilization, even now, as the country descends into civil war. 

Despite the repressive measures taken by countries around the region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) features several of the fastest growing economies in the world, and the World Bank predicts that ASEAN will continue its rapid growth rate in upcoming years. Will enlarged economies and revenues give more resources to already repressive regimes, further stifling democratic growth or rebirth? Or will growing prosperity lead more citizens to demand democratic institutions and rights? For now, only time will tell.

Columbia Political Review