Policy 360: Obstacles at the Olympics—The Beijing 2022 Winter Games

The 2022 Winter Olympic Games officially ended on February 20, 2022, closing not only a period of amicable competition between the world’s top athletes, but also a brief chapter of tense international feuding. When China won its bid in 2015 to host the 2022 Winter Games, it seemed like a cause for celebration for the first country in the world to have a “dual Olympic city”, given that Beijing had also hosted the 2008 Summer Games. However, due to ensuing challenges ranging from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic to the enormous monetary and environmental costs of creating an artificial environment suited for winter sports, hosting the 2022 Games began to appear more like an obstacle that China had to overcome. In fact, one of the primary obstacles faced by the organizers of the Games was the international controversy surrounding its very location in China, the site of alleged human rights abuses against the Uyghur population. Before the Olympics even started, several countries declared diplomatic boycotts of the Games, sending a clear message of contempt to China for various reasons.

This roundtable seeks to explore what happens when politics are inserted into an arena that is traditionally viewed as nonpolitical and as a means of bringing nations together. Although political disputes during the 2022 Olympics have been among the most heavily publicized, politics have in fact always been a part of the Olympic Games, starting from the first modern protest at the 1906 Olympics by an Irish track-and-field star. This piece thus aims to illuminate the different reasons why countries may or may not choose to boycott the Olympics, from international human rights charges to strategic reasons. While the United States was the first to declare a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Games where it cited China’s mistreatment of its Uyghur minority, Russia stood in opposition to the boycott given its avowed friendly relationship with the country. Meanwhile, France took a different route: it also opposed the boycott to thwart any potential retaliation from the host of the Games rather than because of friendly relations with the country. By analyzing the perspectives of four different countries on the 2022 Winter Games—China, the U.S., Russia, and France—this piece spurs readers to use sports as a lens through which to understand international politics.

Gaming for Hegemony: China’s Rise to Power and Risks of Isolation 

By Carsten Barnes, School of General Studies ’23

The morning of the opening ceremony of the 2022 Winter Olympics, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement condemning, among other things, “American interventionism” in the affairs of sovereign nations. The statement directly criticized the U.S. for fomenting "color revolutions" in former Soviet republics, highlighting that its bellicose nature stands in stark contrast to the prevailing diplomatic atmosphere when China last hosted the Olympics in 2008. This contrast has been by design—China has used the 2022 Winter Olympics as a platform, not to herald its arrival on the international stage as in 2008, but rather to announce its maturity and its readiness for a position of global leadership, thus challenging the hegemony of the U.S. 

One of the more obvious ways in which China has used the 2022 Olympics to highlight this maturity has been by showcasing the power and strength of the Chinese model of government through its enforcement of extremely strict “zero-Covid” policies. China created an Olympic “bubble” that required not only all athletes but also all support staff, involved workers, and family members to completely isolate themselves from the general public for the duration of the games.

Additionally, China has used the Olympics to showcase its greatly improved infrastructure: a brand new high-speed rail from Beijing whisks travelers to the site of the Olympics at speeds up to 350 kph, and the government temporarily nationalized and expanded several local resorts to provide housing for the athletes. 

However, the opening ceremony took on added significance for China after the U.S.’ announcement of a diplomatic boycott of the Olympics in response to China’s alleged genocide of its Uyghur minority in western Xinjiang. Many European countries joined the boycott, placing pressure on China. But despite the boycott, world leaders from 22 countries including Egypt, Qatar, and Russia still attended the opening of the games, thus highlighting Beijing’s growing independence from the Western liberal world order. China also used the opening ceremony as an opportunity to head off criticism of its treatment of its Uyghur minority by having the Uyghur athlete Dinigeer Yilamujiang participate in the lighting of the Olympic flame.

China has deftly used these Olympic Games to showcase areas in which its form of government offers comparative advantages to the more liberal systems, particularly in relation to that of the U.S. It did so primarily by shining a spotlight on its zero-Covid policies and infrastructure investments in industries where the U.S. has fallen behind. 

However, what China did not seem to have been able to do during these Olympics—judging from the relatively low diplomatic attendance at the opening and closing ceremonies—is to reassure other Asian and African countries that it is a benign force on the world stage. As China presents an increasingly confident, almost bellicose approach to international relations, it is in danger of alienating neutral countries and isolating itself on the global stage. 

U.S. Politicalization of the Olympics as a Long-Term Strategy of Delegitimization

By Moya Linsey, Barnard College ‘25

In December 2021, the Biden administration proclaimed a diplomatic boycott against the 2022 Olympic Games, set to be hosted in Beijing. Jen Psaki, the White House Press Secretary, pointed to China’s “genocide and crimes against humanity” as the reasoning behind the boycott. This declaration brought the great power games between China and the U.S. into the fore, demonstrating an attempt on the part of the U.S. to elevate its rivalry with Beijing. 

The diplomatic boycott did not extend to the athletes of Team USA; rather, it meant that the U.S. would not send an official delegation of government officials to the games, where they would have interacted with and been photographed alongside Chinese representatives. To extend the boycott to the athletes would essentially punish them for Chinese human rights violations, which aside from being nonsensical, would also create ill-will among the American public who look forward to supporting their favorite contestants every four years. Instead, Psaki stated that the White House simply did not want to “[contribute] to the fanfare of the Games.” By refusing to dispatch a delegation, the U.S. appeared hopeful that these Olympic Games would not seem as formal—or at least, elaborate—as they have in previous years. Since prominent members of the American government like former Vice President Mike Pence often led the delegation in the past, the lack of a high-profile figure was meant to disrupt the political legitimacy of the Olympics.

The U.S. proclaimed this diplomatic boycott in response to accusations of the severe oppression of Uyghur Muslims who reside in the province of Xinjiang. In December 2021, Biden signed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act into law, imposing sanctions on the government officials who are responsible for the forced labor programs, and prohibiting imports from Xinjiang until the American government can prove that the products were not made with forced labor. This policy could have serious economic ramifications for China. The province of Xinjiang produces two highly desirable products: cotton and refined polysilicon. 20% of the world’s cotton and almost 50% of refined polysilicon come from the region, and without the capacity to export them to the U.S., the economy of Xinjiang will surely take a hit. The Olympics boycott, in addition to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, will only intensify antagonism between the two countries. 

In response to the boycott, China claimed that the U.S. was “politicizing sports.” While this may be true, politics have already infiltrated the Olympics in the past. More importantly, the U.S. seems to want to politicize the Beijing Olympics. In 1980, America famously boycotted the Moscow Olympics, refusing to send government officials or athletes to the former Soviet Union. While the U.S. cited the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan as its reason for boycotting the Moscow Olympics, the boycott did not achieve its intended goal: the USSR did not leave Afghanistan until 1989, a full nine years after the games. In a paralleled manner, the U.S.’ decision to boycott the 2022 Games was perhaps not about achieving an immediate political goal; rather, it was an attempt to delegitimize the Beijing Olympics and exacerbate its preexisting tensions with China for potential long-term gain. 

Realist Russia Intensifying Ideological Competition for Self Interests

By Marla Rink, General Studies ‘23

Alarm bells were ringing in the West when Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov made the claim that “[Russia’s] position is that the Olympic Games should be free of politics.” By opposing the U.S.’ decision to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, Russia’s decision to send official delegates to the Olympic Games has raised questions about the extent to which this decision was truly in favor of their claim that the Olympics “should be free of politics,” or a strategic political move. Russian President Vladmir Putin claimed that the U.S.’ decision to boycott was “a mistake,” and that “[Russia’s] Chinese friends [had] done a great job for high-quality preparations” for the Games. By referring to China as a “friend” and by praising its preparations, Russia not only differentiated itself by opposing the boycott, but it also demonstrated overt support for Beijing. While Thomas Bach, the IOC President, identifies the mission of the Olympic Games as to “get all humanity together [...] beyond political disputes,” to what extent is this Russia’s priority? 

In recent years, new strategies have been employed by politicians to increase national security and to strengthen their own economies. In light of this, Russia most likely supported the Olympics for Moscow to strengthen the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, and a way for it to take an ideological stance against the U.S. Unsurprisingly, this would not be an anomaly; in the 1980s, the U.S. boycotted the Olympics in Moscow, and in 1984, the Soviet Union implemented retaliatory boycotts against the Summer Games in Los Angeles. Noting the divide between Russia and the U.S., the Olympic Games have arguably become another platform to express these competing ideologies. 

According to the realist approach to international politics, states are self-interested actors that compete on the basis of power. Ideologies are the primary way for states to both remain in power and exert their dominance. This was prevalent during the Cold War, which created a bipolar world order between Russia and the U.S. With the rise of China as another superpower, countries have made decisions in the interest of benefiting their own economies and international credibility. This fact was evident in the Kremlin’s announcement that Putin’s talks with Xi Jinping would include topics of “regional matters,” as well as in the divide in the West as seen through the conflicting approaches between the US and France, which has demonstrated that the democratic values of human rights can be compromised when profits are at stake. Therefore, the use of ideologies to justify decisions with regards to the boycott is not about whether the Olympic Games should be “free of politics,” but rather about the ways in which countries view their decisions as ways to benefit themselves. This stance will not change until states begin to recognize that the interests of humanity are also in their own interests. Russia’s refusal to partake in the boycott is aligned with this realist approach, as it prefers competition over cooperation to achieve self-interested outcomes.

An Assertion of French Independence in International Diplomacy 

By Hanna Zarrinnegar, Columbia College ‘24

Amid the diplomatic boycotts of the Chinese Winter Olympics by the U.S. and other European countries, France has taken an independent approach. President Macron has established his nation’s position against the boycott, stating, “I don't think we should politicize these topics, especially if it is to take steps that are insignificant and symbolic.” Given Beijing’s threats of retaliation, France’s abstinence from the boycott was an act of self-preservation. Additionally, it appears that France generally disapproves of bringing political battles into an athletic sphere. Most importantly, France’s refusal to boycott is reflective of a shift in the nation’s foreign policy—it seeks to no longer serve as an unconditional ally of the U.S., but rather act as an individual entity.

Economically, France is highly dependent on China. As of 2018, China was France’s second largest supplier and seventh largest customer. As such, it is undeniable that France’s economy is deeply intertwined with China’s, which provides Beijing with the power to retaliate and exploit the French if faced with conflict.

Simultaneously, France generally regards China as a systemic rival. According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of the French population held unfavorable views towards China in 2020, primarily due to increased awareness of the Chinese government’s human rights violations against the country’s Uyghur population. In addition to public condemnations of the Chinese government’s actions, in March 2021, France and its European Union partners imposed sanctions on Chinese senior officials who were most directly involved with the mistreatment of Uyghurs. Beijing immediately retaliated and adopted sanctions against European nationals.

France sees it as an act of self-interest to avoid the boycott of the Olympics for a variety of reasons. Primarily, Beijing has a tendency to adopt aggressive tit-for-tat measures, as demonstrated by its retaliatory sanctions against European nationals in 2021. Given France’s trading relationship with China, retaliatory measures could present a major threat to the French economy. Concerning the current boycott, the Chinese government has already warned that the U.S. “will pay a price for its erroneous actions.” Set to host the next Olympic Games in 2024, France wishes to avoid a retributive boycott on behalf of the Chinese government. In short, for France, the risk of Chinese aggression—either in the form of a similar boycott in 2024, or economic sanctions—is simply not worth the political statement of boycotting the Olympic Games.

The general shift of French foreign policy away from being an unconditional ally to the U.S. could also explain France’s desire for a more independent approach to the Chinese Winter Olympics. In recent years, the E.U. has been debating its position in the ongoing power struggle between the U.S. and China. Though previously considered an unconditional ally of the U.S., France is beginning to forge its own path and behave independently. In September 2021, in light of the trilateral AUKUS defense pact between the U.S., Britain, and Australia, the Chinese ambassador to France began urging for the French government’s cooperation, claiming that a cooperative relationship is “in the best interests of the whole world.” At the same time, French President Macron recalled his ambassadors to the U.S. and Australia due to the pact. AUKUS is one example of the general foreign policy shift of the French government, and the current abstinence from the boycott of the Chinese Olympic Games further exemplifies France’s desire to behave and be seen as an independent entity.

Conclusion

Whether fundamentally “political” or not, the context of this year’s Olympic Games in Beijing has featured a fierce foreign policy battle. The hostile approaches of some states towards China’s ongoing and unjustifiable human rights violations evidently differs from those of Russia and France, which have defended their approaches for varying reasons. While this roundtable frames the diplomatic boycott of the Olympics as undeniably pertinent to states’ approaches to China’s treatment of minority populations, the geopolitical scheme of these Games did not present a clear zero-sum situation. Instead, the Games have represented a unique context wherein geopolitical realities have taken on a new form. Self-interests, even if concealed, remain the primary driver of state action. The fact that this has been clearly reflected in the arena of sports competition is telling of international politics today.