The 57 State Strategy: Too Much, Too Late

Some strikingly across-the-aisle campaign signs from Richard Nixon’s bids for the presidency. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

The 2024 election cycle will go down in history as an apocalyptic, once-in-a-generation collapse of the Democratic Party—losing both the Presidency and Senate while also failing to take the House of Representatives. In combination with a 6-3 conservative majority in the Supreme Court, these losses mark one of the lowest points for the Democratic establishment in history. Basically, the Democrats are in a uniquely bad situation.

Somewhat hidden in the ensuing news flood of then-President-elect Trump’s cabinet picks and the general fallout from the election was DNC Chair Jaime Harrison’s decision to step down and refuse to run for another term. Harrison’s resignation opened the door for Ken Martin, the then-chair of the Minnesota Democratic Party, to step up to the national level. He ran a strong campaign on classic talking points such as rebuilding the Democratic Party by returning to its identity as “the party of the working class” and tapping back into the faltering youth voting bloc. However, one of the most unique aspects of Martin’s campaign was his promise, featured proudly on his website, to implement a 57 State Party Strategy. This would involve significant investments in building up the Democrats’ presence throughout the country, including deep red states like Wyoming and Louisiana. 

Martin’s website boldly states that the Democratic Party will “go on offense everywhere in America” by building up strong local networks. This compelling angle has a long history in electoral politics; however, in the current environment where Republicans have commanding control of all three branches of the federal government and less than 30% of races are considered competitive, one has to question the timing of this plan. While Ken Martin's 57 State Strategy might aid in party-building for the Democratic Party in the long term, in the immediate aftermath of catastrophic losses, it will ultimately backfire as must-win battleground states find themselves underfunded during the competitive 2026 and 2028 cycles.

The idea of campaigning for all 50 states is far from a new one: Richard Nixon infamously promised to visit every state in his failed 1960 campaign, which helped set up his dominant 1972 election, where he pulled 49 states and made gains in House races. Ronald Reagan also demonstrated a nationwide appeal in a historic 1984 election that matched Nixon’s performance. The idea has been attempted even as recently as the early 21st century, under the four-year term of former DNC Chair Howard Dean (2005-2009). Back then, the Democrats reaped the rewards, making respectable gains in the 2006 midterms before dominating the 2008 cycle. Notably, Obama made large inroads into Ohio, Indiana, and North Carolina; even more impactfully, historically red Virginia voted and has remained Democrat since. At first glance, Martin is definitely drawing from a successful history.

However, a closer examination of the historical case studies shows that cracks quickly appear beneath the surface. For example, Nixon’s promise likely cost him the 1960 election as he overextended himself and his campaign's resources by trying to visit every state. Moreover, Nixon and Reagan’s landslide victories were instead more dependent on favorable national conditions, such as deep unrest and high appeal, than a coordinated 50-state plan. Similarly, the Democratic Party’s gains of the late 2000s victories were not fueled by party strategy but by an unpopular sitting president in 2006 and a devastating economic crisis in 2008. Without such extenuating national circumstances, as seen in the 2010 midterms where Republicans made historic congressional gains, a lack of strategic investment in key swing districts can be devastating. The underlying message behind the history is that large investments into all 50 states must come during strategic periods where a party is greatly popular or its opponent(s) are deeply unpopular. 

The present could not be further from the opportune time. The Democrats are not in a position of power and face a historically poor approval rating. These factors put increased scrutiny and pressure on key battleground races because they are necessary for party success. The DNC faces a large obstacle when convincing swing voters, essentially requiring large funds to compete in these high-stakes races. Even more, current congressional district maps would undercut many of the investments Democrats make outside of these areas. In this most recent cycle, only 30% of elections were considered competitive, resulting from a mixture of gerrymandering and political polarization that has left significant gains in many of these districts and local offices out of reach for either party. In effect, this imposes a soft cap that limits places where the Democrats could stand a chance at competing—places that would essentially serve as money drains. 

In the end, we are left with a historically unpopular party competing for virtually unwinnable districts where a full commitment to a 50 State Strategy would be shooting the Democratic Party in the foot. It needs to focus on the places where they can win and invest heavily in those races if they want a chance at gaining back control of any branch of the government. For example, imagine if the DNC was unable to send much-needed funding to John Ossoff’s pivotal Georgia Senate race because it spent significant resources putting up a challenger in House Speaker Mike Johnson’s Louisiana 4th district! Party-building and sending funds to uncompetitive areas is incredibly important to making inroads like we saw in Virginia in 2008, but that cannot be the main focus of the DNC’s limited funds when the Republicans control our federal government and appear to have a straightforward path to maintaining their majority in the Senate. There are places for local organizations to be recognized, given a spotlight, and even coordinated with, but the DNC must rely on grassroots organizing and small investments. Ken Martin has implemented a phenomenal long-term process, but his immediate goal for the next two-to-four years must be to win now. Strategic, concentrated investment is necessary if Democrats wish to regain power—and for now, that path does not lie through Louisiana.

J. Adler Rice (CC ’28) is a staff writer for CPR studying history and political science. He is interested in electoral politics, domestic agenda, and presidential history. In his free time, he enjoys playing pick-up basketball and reading mystery novels.