Iran’s Game of Strategic Uranium Enrichment
A heavy water production facility in Arak, Iran. Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
In 2002, the West was alarmed. The National Council of Resistance of Iran had just exposed secret nuclear facilities, revealing Tehran’s potential nuclear ambitions. After the discovery, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitored Iran closely; however, due to the “dual-use” nature of nuclear technology, it can often be challenging to distinguish between programs meant for non-military use and those aimed at weapons development. While nuclear energy might be used for military purposes, it can also be used peacefully in medical and agricultural applications. Despite these challenges, the secret facilities in Iran were found to be enriching uranium through advanced centrifuges, a process not typically required for peaceful energy purposes and often associated with the development of nuclear weapons.
In response to these developments, the IAEA concluded that Iran must stop all uranium enrichment activities. After Iran refused to comply, the United Nations Security Council intervened, imposing sanctions on Iran for continuing to enrich uranium. This did not stop Iran from developing advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment, raising concerns in the international community about its intentions to acquire nuclear weapons.
Given the discovery of these activities, both American and Israeli intelligence agencies have frequently warned about Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear bomb. For example, in 2003, Israeli intelligence claimed that Iran had the potential to make a nuclear bomb by 2007. In 2005, United States intelligence warned that Iran could acquire a nuclear bomb by 2015. In 2009, however, the Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said that Iran could have a nuclear weapon by 2011, and in 2011, the chief of the Mossad said that Iran could have a nuclear bomb by 2015.
However, despite such warnings, Iran did not produce a nuclear bomb within the expected time frame. This could be explained by Iran’s fear of international retaliation or as a result of sabotage efforts by Israel and the United States, but these factors alone do not explain the mixed signals Iran has sent about its nuclear program. A Congressional Research Service report in 2019 stated that “Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons” and “any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is inherently reversible.” In 2024, another report found that “Tehran has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but has halted its nuclear weapons program.” Furthermore, at critical points, Iran has sped up or slowed down its production of enriched uranium and agreed to negotiations limiting its ability to produce nuclear weapons.
Iran’s ambiguous behavior surrounding its nuclear program may be explained as a strategy of nuclear hedging. Iran’s enrichment program could be aimed at retaining the capability to produce a bomb without actually crossing that threshold; that is, retaining a “breakout capacity,” or the ability to produce a bomb within a short period of time if they chose to do so. Several factors may go into this decision. Iran’s rapid uranium enrichment does not necessarily indicate a desire to possess a nuclear bomb; rather, it could signify a strategic maneuver by the Iranian government to further its political objectives while avoiding the repercussions of physically producing a bomb.
Firstly, Tehran arguably furthers its security goals by stopping short of developing a nuclear bomb. Actually, building a nuclear weapon could further isolate Iran and invite foreign attacks. Kenneth Waltz, an international relations scholar, has argued that countries with nuclear capabilities have historically felt more vulnerable and that “their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers.” Furthermore, nuclear threats are not credible as a “coercive tool”; experts have argued that if Iran used a nuclear bomb, it could result in “unprecedented international isolation, unify the region against it, and even trigger nuclear retaliation from the United States or Israel.” Thus, possessing a nuclear weapon may not enhance Iran’s interests and could actually undermine its security. Instead, Tehran is able to leverage its uranium enrichment during times of perceived threat as a form of deterrence. For example, following the October 7th, 2023, Hamas attack against Israel, Iran “initiated a threefold increase in its enrichment of near-bomb-grade uranium,” arguably as a signal to deter a retaliatory Israeli strike.
Furthermore, toeing the line right at the cusp of a bomb is, in many senses, politically advantageous. Publicly flirting with the idea of creating a bomb allows Tehran to strengthen its bargaining position with the international community. When Iran first began enriching uranium, it caused panic within the international community due to proliferation concerns. As a result, Iran engaged in numerous talks with global powers regarding its nuclear capabilities. It is possible that Iran used the rapid enrichment of uranium to unsettle the West and enhance its negotiating position. In exchange for refraining from developing nuclear weapons, Iran may be granted concessions that it might not have otherwise received.
This is best exemplified by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement reached between Iran, the United States, and other major world powers. Prior to this agreement, Iran faced severe international sanctions, which devastated its economy and cost the country billions of dollars in revenue. The JCPOA agreement, signed during the Obama administration, aimed to slow Iran’s nuclear program. In exchange for Iran agreeing to halt its production of highly enriched uranium (among other commitments), the international community agreed to lift some of the harsh sanctions imposed on the country. Although this deal seemed to successfully limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Tehran was able to negotiate the lifting of international sanctions while maintaining its ability to create a nuclear bomb. For example, the deal contained “sunset provisions,” which placed expiration dates on many of its conditions. By leveraging the threat of a nuclear bomb, Iran secured sanctions relief while maintaining the long-term ability to produce nuclear weapons.
A final advantage of maintaining a “breakout capacity” rather than fully developing a bomb is that it could help Tehran manage its domestic politics. The current government is domestically unpopular as a result of its repressive policies and poor economy. However, uranium enrichment has become a source of “national pride” for Tehran, serving as a demonstration of its technological advancement and willingness to stand up to the West. It is possible that if Iran built up its nuclear program, the government’s popularity would be bolstered. Additionally, there is internal disagreement within the government as hardliners increasingly push for the development of nuclear weapons, arguing that it would provide Iran with greater security and that their progress with enrichment is advanced enough to just “go for a bomb.” However, others have religious and economic reservations regarding nuclear weapons. For example, in 2012, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that “ideologically and religiously speaking, we believe that it is not right [to have nuclear weapons]... and we would never seek this.” Furthermore, maintaining nuclear weapons is expensive, especially on top of the costs of traditional military forces. Therefore, by continuing to enrich uranium without building a bomb, Tehran could potentially boost its popularity and reassure extremists of their capability to quickly become a nuclear state if necessary, while avoiding the religious and economic implications of acquiring nuclear weapons.
The question of whether Iran is actually seeking to develop nuclear weapons has been widely debated, given the conflicting signals the country has often sent about its intentions. On one hand, Iran has violated numerous IAEA security provisions and produced highly enriched uranium despite international sanctions. On the other hand, Iranian leaders have consistently affirmed the country’s peaceful intentions, complied with the JCPOA agreement for a time, and slowed down uranium enrichment on several occasions. Indeed, to our knowledge, Iran has not yet produced nuclear weapons.
Iran’s ambiguous stance can be understood through the lens of nuclear hedging: advancing nuclear capabilities while stopping short of actually creating a bomb. By closely scrutinizing Iran’s political motivations, it becomes clear that Tehran gains several advantages by positioning itself in such a way. Through nuclear hedging, Iran can advance its security, wield greater power in the international community, and manage its domestic politics, all while avoiding the repercussions typically associated with actually producing nuclear weapons.
Recently, threats of military action against Iran by the Trump administration seem to have shifted the calculus in Tehran, making the strategy of nuclear hedging increasingly costly. As the United States marches towards negotiations with Iran, the administration should continue to raise the pressure on Tehran in hopes that this will change their decision-making. Implementing strong and effective sanctions as well as threatening military action can take away the advantages Iran has obtained through enrichment and put an end to their nuclear program once and for all.
Rivka Yellin (BC ‘26) is a junior studying political science and history.