With Friends Like These: Israel, Turkey, and a New Syria
A bird’s eye view of Damascus. Photo courtesy of Vyacheslav Argenberg.
The United States appears bullish on a new Syria. President Trump’s meetings with former Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader and new Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa at the UN General Assembly in September and in Saudi Arabia months earlier, along with his historic decision to lift major sanctions on Syria, have granted the new government important support as it seeks to reintroduce Syria to the global community. Additionally, with Iran now further weakened and reeling from its 12-day war with Israel, the region stands at an inflection point. Despite intermittent sectarian clashes, there exists an unprecedented opportunity to establish and help shape a prosperous and free future for Syria, all while ensuring Israel’s lasting security in the Golan–– but only if all parties give diplomacy a chance. With this in mind, recent developments indicating Israel and Syria are close to a “de-escalation agreement” are encouraging.
The Trump administration cannot allow this moment to slip away. The situation on the ground remains, and will remain for the foreseeable future, highly complex and dynamic. And while the current ceasefire in the Druze city of Suwayda is a welcome and encouraging development, navigating this moment will require careful diplomacy and a commitment to stability from all parties involved.
Since the fall of the Assad regime in December, Israel has established a significant military presence in southern Syria, with a buffer zone extending far beyond the UN disengagement line established in 1974 following the Six-Day War. In this buffer zone, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has dug trenches, built fortified posts, and operates regular patrols. In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s ouster, the Israeli Air Force maintained a steady cadence of airstrikes in Syria, wiping out much of the military infrastructure left over from the old regime. However, Israel’s intervention then and now is not only presented in the name of self-defense but also as serving to protect the Syrian Druze community. In May, the IDF launched strikes in response to sectarian violence that threatened the Syrian Druze in the southern region of Suwayda. Those strikes resumed in July as sectarian violence again flared between the Syrian Druze community, Bedouin militias, and government forces.
Despite mixed opinions amongst Syrian Druze, Israel has leaned heavily on rhetoric about protecting them to justify its military actions in southern Syria. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz stated after a spate of airstrikes in July that “Israel is committed to preventing harm to the Druze in Syria due to the deep brotherly alliance with our Druze citizens in Israel.” Coming to the aid of Syrian Druze pays domestic dividends as Israeli Druze are deeply integrated into Israeli society, serving in the IDF at high rates despite their minority status. More broadly, however, Israel remains wary of a relatively new and unfamiliar government on its northern border, especially in the aftermath of the October 7th attacks. This legitimate concern has shaped the way Israel has aggressively asserted itself in Syria, just as it has recently against Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Mullahs in Iran.
While bloody sectarian clashes have dominated the news, Israel's skepticism of the new government in Damascus is best understood in the context of Turkey's efforts to support Al-Sharaa and HTS. Ankara sees an opportunity not only to shape Syria’s political future but also to extend its influence, prevent refugee flow to Turkey, facilitate refugee return, and weaken Kurdish autonomy efforts.
Turkey and Israel, whose relationship has soured considerably over the war in Gaza, have repeatedly accused the other of standing in the way of peace and stability in Syria. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar has repeatedly criticized Turkey’s involvement with and support for HTS, declaring that “we don’t think that Syria should be a Turkish protectorate.” In April, the IDF bombed at least three air bases Ankara had hoped to repurpose. Meanwhile, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has accused Israel of attempting to "fragment Syria” through bombing campaigns and escalating military interventions.
Israel’s continued unilateral involvement in southern Syria, whether motivated by a policy of self-defense or a sense of responsibility toward the Druze, complicates the Syrian government’s efforts to stabilize the country and establish its sovereignty. These actions, especially when uncoordinated with the US, also risk exacerbating tensions between Damascus, Ankara, and Washington at a time when coordination is urgently needed. While Israel has shown its willingness to strike alone and without American support, the United States must nonetheless work to foster a coordinated diplomatic approach among the three countries that places Syria—and the region’s—long-term stability at the forefront of any mission. Successful diplomatic efforts, including trilateral talks in Paris, have yielded encouraging signs that a security deal, likely along the lines of the disengagement agreement of 1974, could be reached soon. A security deal could even produce further bilateral co-operation between Syria and Israel, though that may be a far-off prospect.
As Washington winds down its direct military involvement in Syria, President Trump retains considerable diplomatic capital in Jerusalem and Ankara. For the foreseeable future, Syria will be in a fragile, uncertain, and closely-watched transition under a nascent HTS-backed government. The United States should use its influence—through security and trade deals—to encourage Israel, Syria, and Turkey to continue with a diplomacy-first approach. While sectarian tensions may be unavoidable, calmer heads must prevail. American support and strong Turkish involvement could keep a watchful eye on Damascus, all while ensuring a stable Syria can emerge that offers Israel the security it needs, Turkey strategic depth, and a path toward rapprochement between all three.
This is all possible— President Trump has even floated Syria joining the Abraham Accords — but first, diplomacy must carry the day.
Natan Rosenbaum (GS/JTS ‘26) is a senior in the Joint Program between JTS and Columbia’s School of General Studies, studying American Studies and Talmud.
Yasha Van Praagh (GS/JTS ‘26) is a senior in the Joint Program between JTS and Columbia’s School of General Studies, studying History and Jewish Ethics.