The Dragon, the Bear, and U.S. Allies
U.S. President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron at a joint press conference at the White House, December 1, 2022. Photo by Adam Schultz.
Three weeks before his tanks rolled into Ukraine, Putin was on a plane to Beijing. After meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, the two leaders announced a “no limits” partnership: Russia and China would oppose NATO expansion and promote a multipolar order. Beneath the diplomatic jargon, the partnership was directed at the dominant superpower, the United States.
Over a year later, the Sino-Russian partnership remains strong. Russian humiliation in Ukraine and Chinese internal malaise notwithstanding, Xi and Putin have expanded their partnership, perpetuating fears that two prongs in the U.S.-China-Russia strategic triangle are fixed against Washington. Concerns of two Eurasian titans in a close embrace, however, obscure the benefits Sino-Russian alignment can produce for immediate American interests.
Russian and European China Policy
In a prolonged competition with Beijing, moving allies to face the China challenge is vital for Washington. As U.S. Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, recently noted, “The United States is now making a big push to revitalize our ties with friends and partners,” to deepen economic resiliency and multilaterally compete with Beijing. In this context, given Europe’s collective economic and political weight, transatlantic unity on China is urgently needed.
Unfortunately for Washington, China’s economic pull means Beijing has the ability to hamstring transatlantic cohesion on China policy. Recent comments made by French President Macron, in which he noted Europe must avoid taking sides on Taiwan, illustrate this problem, as do divides between the EU’s European Council and European Commission, with the former opting for a less hawkish approach towards China than the latter. For Washington, therefore, the process of building transatlantic consensus on China policy has been arduous. This is where Putin’s Russia can play an important role: the closer Russia and China are perceived to be in Europe, the easier it is for America to rally Europeans against China.
China’s stance on the War in Ukraine demonstrates how closer Sino-Russian alignment can benefit Washington. By standing shoulder to shoulder with Putin weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine, Xi was seen as an accomplice behind Europe’s most pressing security threat. Eastern European states in particular, hitherto open to Chinese economic initiatives, have hardened their stance on China. Indeed, the Czech Republic alongside Slovakia has pursued closer ties with Taiwan, Romania has continued its “tough on China” approach, and the Baltic States and Poland have been more hawkish of Chinese influence. Simultaneously, all these states have expanded ties with America. In aligning his country with Moscow on Ukraine, Xi appears to have pushed Eastern Europe into Washington’s embrace.
Beijing’s Ukraine stance has also pushed Western Europe to adopt China policies favored by Washington. For example, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen cited Beijing’s support for Russia’s war when she called for policies designed to lessen European dependence on China. Additionally, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell urged European states to send warships to the Taiwan Strait to avoid another Ukraine. Likewise, German Foreign Minister Angela Baerbock cited Beijing’s support for Moscow when she made confrontational statements with her Chinese interlocutors, and when she pushed for a tougher China policy in Berlin. Similarly, Germany’s Christian Democrats––usually keen on pursuing good trade ties with China––produced an about-face when they published a party paper citing Xi’s support for Putin’s war that called for a tougher stance on Beijing’s influence. Finally, Italy has signaled it will ditch China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with Giorgia Meloni’s government noting Chinese support for Moscow’s aggression as a factor behind this decision.
Of course, given the size of China’s economy, some European leaders still avoid antagonizing Beijing. In contrast with his Foreign Minister, German Chancellor Scholz has continued to call for economic cooperation with China. Likewise, Macron’s comments concerning Taiwan have prompted fears Europe is disunited on China policy. Yet these setbacks illustrate why closer Sino-Russian alignment can weaken dovish European voices. It is no surprise Eastern European states most directly at risk of Russian attack were quick to reject Macron’s statements, fearing potential abandonment by their most important security partner––the United States. Accordingly, perceptions of closer Sino-Russian alignment can aid American efforts aimed at opposing problematic stances like that of Macron.
Regardless of Macron’s comments, signs of debate in Europe concerning China are consistent with international realities. Many believe that Ukraine and the emerging U.S.-China competition signal a new era in international affairs. In this changing international environment, like in the post-Cold War period, changes in policy by countries are natural, and so is debate about said shifts in policy. In Washington, a bipartisan consensus concerning China’s pressing threat emerged in the late 2010s. From an American point of view, then, the goal should be to produce similar outcomes in allied capitals.
To that end, providing would-be European China hawks with ammunition to move the debate to their side is vital. Perceptions of strong ties between Moscow and Beijing, therefore, can push the policy debate closer to the China hawks’ favor given European consensus of the threat emanating from Russia. An instructive example is the United Kingdom and its Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. Widely seen as softer on Beijing than his two predecessors, Sunak’s government has nevertheless doubled-down on the AUKUS partnership, pushed for a more assertive British Indo-Pacific policy, and delivered a speech highly critical of China. Sunak’s change in tone could be explained by intra-Tory party dynamics: a coalition of China hawks in the Tory party have pushed Sunak to embrace a tougher China policy. In this debate, Beijing’s support for Moscow aided Tory hawks in their intra-party debate. Aforementioned shifts in the German Christian Democrats can be seen as part of a similar pattern. Regardless, in both the 2022 and 2023 G7 Summits, Washington garnered support behind joint statements critical of Beijing in part by leveraging China’s stance on Ukraine.
Consequently, the Sino-Russian partnership can serve American interests by helping create cohesion on China policy among Western capitals. Given the West’s collective economic and political weight, a failure to obtain allied cohesion could harm U.S. efforts to compete with China, and potentially undermine successful deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Accordingly, pushing Russia and China closer aids U.S. interests in Europe and Asia. As China expert Bonny Lin outlines, Beijing is aware of this, but China’s recent efforts aimed at portraying itself as a peacemaker in Ukraine have so far failed to change negative European perceptions of China. As such, Putin’s Ukraine folly has generated a new maxim Washington ought to heed: to keep your friends close, push your enemies closer.
Lucas de Gamboa (CC’25) is a staff writer at the Columbia Political Review and studies political science and economics. He is interested in national security, transatlantic relations, and Sino-U.S. relations.