To Protect Taiwan, Washington Should Reject Calls for Ending Strategic Ambiguity
Aircraft from the American aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan, in the South China Sea. Photo by Kaila V. Peters.
Washington and Beijing are locked in a global rivalry over who will dominate the 21st century. As President Biden’s National Security Strategy states, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intends to become “the world’s leading power.” Many American strategists have come to the conclusion that, in order to deny Chinese preeminence, Taiwan must remain permanently separated from the PRC.
To that end, there is increasing debate regarding the future of Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” towards Taiwan. Under ambiguity, Washington is deliberately vague about whether it will provide military support to Taiwan if China were to invade. In doing so, Washington aims to deter two actors: Beijing and Taipei. Indeed, the PRC cannot be sure that America will stay out, hence it is theoretically deterred from invading Taiwan, while Taipei has no guarantee Washington will aid it militarily if it were to declare independence—a red line Beijing maintains would lead to war. This policy has ensured peace since 1979, but some American strategists argue that it is obsolete given Beijing’s newfound power. As former Bush administration official Richard Haass and others advocate, a policy of “strategic clarity”––an unconditional U.S. pledge to defend Taiwan––would more effectively preserve deterrence. Bipartisan support of this opinion is possible, as suggested by the initial draft of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022.
The importance placed on Taiwan and the moral exigency of protecting a fellow democracy by American strategists is justified, however there is skepticism whether protecting Taiwan through clarity is the best strategy. Beijing is facing headwinds which are making it a more insecure, and potentially more aggressive, power. A policy of clarity will hamper deterrence by aggravating a pessimistic PRC.
Beijing’s Sobering Outlook
The PRC faces pressing internal problems which are sapping its confidence. Chief among them is demography. In the coming decades, China will lose over 200 million working age adults and its population is projected to halve by 2100. As Michael Beckley and Hal Brands demonstrate, “China’s age-related spending will need to triple as a share of GDP, from 10% to 30%” to deal with this problem. Today, all of China’s government spending totals 30% of GDP. It is thus no surprise that Beijing’s leadership has fought––unsuccessfully––to reverse these trends.
Beijing also faces severe economic headwinds. Since the 2008 Financial Crisis, Beijing’s growth model has depended on investment spending, primarily on infrastructure, accounting for nearly 50% of the country’s GDP. However, over 60% of Chinese infrastructure spending is inefficient, and China wastes almost $6.9 trillion on “inefficient investment.” The result: an oversaturated property market, overcapacity in Chinese industries, and debt reaching 355% of GDP––an unprecedented amount for a middle-income country. Finally, Chinese Total Factor Productivity continues to decline, meaning that a vital ingredient for wealth creation in the PRC is negative. Add to this the zero-covid fiasco, President Xi’s authoritarian mismanagement, and Washington’s policies to compete with Beijing, and China’s long-term prospects appear grimmer than predicted.
Of course, Washington also faces hurdles in its effort to maintain its dominance. The discussion above, however, demonstrates that the Chinese government and its citizens have reason to be pessimistic about their country’s future prospects. Beijing faces a breadth of economic problems, including the fact that 10,000 rich Chinese citizens have left the country, and more will follow in their footsteps. Likewise, ordinary citizens share their fellow rich citizens’ views, demonstrated by increased public unrest across China. The legacy of zero-covid is partly to blame. With a profound economic shock followed by nearly a million deaths in January 2023, it is not difficult to see how China’s population has lost faith in the government’s competence. Ergo, the risk of internal upheaval in China is high.
The Perils of Chinese Pessimism and Clarity
Pessimistic powers are dangerous powers and Beijing has reason to be cynical about its long-term prospects. History suggests this fatalism could be a problem.
After the Financial Crisis, China seemed ascendant internationally but was also wary of internal instability. Though China’s confidence increased because of America’s perceived decline, Beijing’s growth model was called into question. Economic malaise in China’s export markets meant the PRC had less buyers of Chinese-made goods and less capital to induce growth. As such, the risk of public discontent rose. This situation produced what Columbia University Professor Thomas Christensen deemed Beijing’s “unfortunate combination of external confidence and internal anxiety,” rendering the PRC more aggressive on matters related to Chinese nationalism.
Why was this the case? Chinese foreign policy does not operate in a vacuum. Public opinion impacts Chinese international conduct. With the rise of social media and nationalism, and the accompanying advent of Chinese power, the Financial Crisis made it impossible for Beijing’s leadership to ignore hawkish domestic voices without risking internal instability. Consequently, Beijing elites faced incentives to react brashly to international events to appease internal factions, as evidenced by the 2012 crisis between China and Japan over the disputed Senkaku islands. Because the dispute evoked memories of Japan’s conquests of China during the early 1900s, it produced sharp nationalist reactions in the PRC. As a result, protests against Japan erupted across China, with many Japanese businesses being boycotted or ransacked. Beijing elites were forced to respond harshly, with aggressive naval and air exercises around the islands. Though a conflict was averted, the Senkaku case serves as a concerning precedent.
Today, the factors which led to Beijing’s combination of overconfidence and internal fear are even more salient. Though China is the second most powerful state in the world, the risk of instability is high. Look no further than to Zero-COVID. Last year’s unrest seemingly succeeded at pressuring the CCP to end the policy. The ripple effects of last year’s events could be significant, for it would not be hard to imagine that future protests would place even more pressure on the government.
This brings the discussion to Taiwan and strategic clarity. Of all the disputes that touch on Chinese nationalism, Taiwan is the most sensitive. It serves as the most potent reminder of the “Century of Humiliation” and is a source of national shame. The potential for severe public protests on matters pertaining to Taiwan is therefore high. In this context, a policy of clarity is especially dangerous. Although Washington’s policy of ambiguity irks Beijing, by maintaining, in principle, an openness to eventual unification under the policy’s opposition to Taiwanese independence, Washington provides Beijing with the necessary reassurance for China to abide by the status quo. A shift to clarity, however, would be a de facto admission of Washington’s desire to permanently separate Taiwan from China. A pledge of that nature could compel Xi to react. The breadth of sensitivities Taiwan touches would be too much to ignore, especially if coupled with protests across China. Moreover, Xi has made enemies in his quest for absolute power and a failure to react to Washington’s perceived gratuitousness toward Taiwan would undermine his legitimacy.
This domestic Chinese consideration is particularly important in the context of coalition building. In the unfortunate event of war over Taiwan, the perception of who started the conflict is crucial for Washington’s success. If China is the clear aggressor, Washington is likely to be joined by a wider coalition in the military and economic sphere; this is in accordance with what former Pentagon official Elbridge Colby calls the “binding” strategy, whereby the aggressor’s “actions must not be seen as defensive or reasonable responses” to outside actor’s conduct. A good example of this theory is Ukraine. Washington garnered widespread international support for Kyiv in part because of Moscow’s unambiguous status as the aggressor.
Taiwan, however, is not Ukraine. Almost all countries recognize Ukraine as a sovereign country, but only 13 states recognize Taiwanese sovereignty, and most countries around the world––including U.S. allies––have deep trade ties with Beijing. Accordingly, as hard as it is for America to admit, most European and developing countries would view a change in U.S. policy towards Taiwan as destabilizing. In this sense, if domestic forces compelled Xi to react militarily to political decisions made in Washington, the perception of who started the conflict would change and it would be difficult to construct a wider coalition. A policy of clarity would thus be inconsistent with the necessities of coalition building. This risk notwithstanding, an invasion of Taiwan may be the least of Washington’s worries under clarity.
The Offshore Island Temptation
How would Xi react in the event of a policy change in Washington? One potential avenue of action would be to seize the off-shore Taiwanese islands of Kinmen and Matsu. This would be relatively easy as the islands are close to the Chinese mainland, the Taiwanese garrison there is weak, and the risk of escalation with Washington would be limited. An attack on the islands is the most potent case against clarity. Indeed, an attack would place Washington in an uncomfortable position. Doing nothing would call into question American credibility, but courting World War III over two small islands would be irresponsible.
To prevent another Crimea, Washington would have to act in the event of an attack, but doing so militarily would be nearly impossible without risking escalation. Additionally, there is no guarantee that Washington would have the domestic support necessary to escalate militarily over the islands. As such, the best option would be to resort to sanctions. However, a sanctions regime that amounts to more than a slap on the wrist would require a multilateral coalition willing to endure pain to hurt China. Would our allies risk huge economic consequences over Kinmen and Matsu, especially if America is seen as the agitator due to its shift in policy? The likely answer is no.
Of course, the risk of an outlying island seizure still exists under the policy of ambiguity, but at least under the status quo, Washington could theoretically avoid uncomfortable political questions about its credibility in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, as stated before, a policy of clarity would most likely be the harbinger of Chinese action. Current policy provides Washington a theoretical off-ramp for inaction against the islands but justifies action against a full-scale invasion or blockade of Taiwan. Ultimately, Washington’s interests are better served under ambiguity.
The Bottom Line
In 2023, Beijing faces a similar situation to that it faced after the Financial Crisis. Economic and social headwinds are raising the likelihood of internal upheaval, all while China has grown to be the second most powerful nation in the world. The result is the same toxic mix of the early 2010s: a China that is likely to overreact to perceived international slights to its pride. Consequently, a switch to clarity would be highly destabilizing––it would most likely put Xi in a position where failure to react to Washington’s action would be devastating to his legitimacy. As a result, action aimed at preventing war could produce the very conflict it intends on avoiding. Furthermore, Xi has avenues of force that do not involve a full-scale invasion. Retaining ambiguity, though no panacea, would at least establish limited guardrails against the risk of Chinese unrest and provide Washington with greater policy flexibility regarding its credibility in Asia.
As America engages in a new twilight struggle with the PRC, aggressively protecting American interests and vigorously preserving U.S. advantages over China is essential. In this competition, calculated risk-taking will be necessary, but only when the costs for Beijing and the benefits for Washington are magnified. A policy of clarity would produce greater risk and little reward. Washington would be more likely to provoke Beijing into conflict and simultaneously erode its credibility and coalition building capacity. This is not an advantage-maximizing strategy for America.
Washington can better safeguard Taiwan’s security by prioritizing the Indo-Pacific area in its diplomacy and economic relations, and by investing in the asymmetric military tools that will enhance America’s ability to deny China a successful attack or blockade. Hence, Washington’s military and economic actions will speak louder than unconditional pledges. To preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait, we should recall President Theodore Roosevelt’s maxim: speak softly and carry a big stick.
Lucas de Gamboa (CC ’25) studies political science and economics. He is interested in national security, transatlantic relations, and Sino-U.S. relations.
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