The Kingdom Rises: Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince vs. Abu Dhabi’s Ruler

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (Left) and the President of the UAE Mohammad Ben Zayed (Right). Photos by U.S. Department of State (Left) and Palácio do Planalto (Right).

“The Most Powerful Arab Ruler Isn’t M.B.S. It’s M.B.Z.,” wrote the New York Times in June of 2019, signaling the growing influence of the United Arab Emirates, or the UAE. The small Gulf nation has caught the world’s attention with its impressive architecture and ever-increasing opulence. But this popularity has also started to unnerve neighboring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Led by its Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman Al Saud, or “MBS” for short, the hydrocarbon powerhouse has been pushing hard to steer its economy away from energy exports amidst the looming global transition to renewables. Funded by its seemingly limitless oil reserves, the Kingdom has unmatched spending power and is putting its money where its mouth is, building infrastructure at a rate reminiscent of Dubai’s explosive growth at the turn of the millennium. Putting it plainly, the Saudis want to overtake the UAE’s economic and touristic dominance, but the Emirates are not going down without a fight. 

The President of the UAE and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohammad Bin Zayed al Nahyan, is referred to as “MBZ” in a nod to his Saudi ally. MBZ has been working to assert the UAE’s economic and trading hub, Dubai, in its position as the economic and tourist center of the Arab World and stealthily tried developing his own distinct foreign policy agenda. MBZ was an early backer of the Trump Administration's effort to restart the peace process between the Arab States and Israel: Abu Dhabi was one of the first signatories to the so-called Abraham Accords, normalizing its relations with Israel. The Accords were hugely significant, both on an economic and political level. Trade between the former enemies hit two-and-a-half billion dollars in the first nine months of 2022, a massive amount only three years after normalization. The Abraham Accords have enabled MBZ to claim significant credit as an enlightened and Western-facing ruler ready to brush aside the feuds of old and establish a new order in the Middle East. It has thrust the UAE to the forefront of a developing anti-Iranian coalition traditionally led by Israel and the Saudis. The Emirates don’t share a terrestrial border with Iran, but they’re only a stone's throw away, separated by the narrow Strait of Hormuz. MBZ’s treaty with Israel makes him the Jewish state's, and by extension America’s natural partner in countering Iran, a vital goal for both sides. It also grants him enough credit to keep hosting wealthy sanctioned individuals that launder their money in Dubai’s opulent resorts without fear of American reprisals. The US has not been so lenient with MBS. The assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey was blamed squarely on him, with President Joe Biden swearing to make him a “pariah.” But the UAE's unassailable moral and strategic leadership is finally coming under threat. 

MBZ was until recently widely seen as MBS's mentor and may even have helped him become Crown Prince, in a break with traditional Saudi royal succession. Pundits see the Emirati President as the architect of many of the two allies' shared policy goals, notably the crackdown on Islamist political parties and their shared approach in progressively giving their populations increased freedoms while suppressing dissent in an enlightened autocracy of sorts. MBZ has benefitted from this relation by making MBS the public-facing face of the reforms and unpopular foreign policy goals while he remains in the shadow as the silent brain of the operation. He also managed to make it seem like MBS forced him into a bloody intervention in Yemen, where the Emirati Air Force pounded the Iranian-aligned Houthi militant group. MBZ allegedly entered the conflict to appease his ally but left the Saudi coalition in late 2019 after five years of a conflict that had turned into an economically and politically costly stalemate. But in fact, he strongly supported and probably encouraged MBS to take up this proxy war against Iran, a fact that has not been lost on the Iranians themselves. Indeed, what attracts Westerners to Dubai and the UAE is its uncharacteristic stability amidst the seemingly permanent turmoil plaguing the Middle East. But the Yemeni conflict dented this sense of safety. The Houthis have regularly launched drone attacks on Saudi soil, but they have recently started targeting the UAE, striking oil infrastructure in Abu Dhabi. Years after the UAE left the Yemen War, this escalation might be direct Iranian reprisals for the Emirates’ increased hostility towards Tehran and its proxies, as well as a manifestation of Tehran’s disapproval of the Abraham Accords which has brought the neighboring UAE closer to the Western anti-Iran axis. The attacks have eroded the country’s peaceful image and attractiveness to foreign investors. MBZ certainly could have done without all this negative advertising. Both sides expected a short and effective intervention that would help protect access to the Red Sea and their shared region: assets vital to the economic survival of Dubai. But the UAE’s withdrawal and subsequent Houthi attacks on Emirati soil are the clearest signs of a looming schism in the two countries’ shared interests. Security has always advantaged the Emirates, but now that they're both under threat by Iran, Saudi Arabia can argue that its military offers foreigners superior protection than the smaller Emirati army. The Saudis are irritated by the long-standing economic and touristic dominance the UAE maintains over the Arab World and they now want to claim their place as the larger country.

MBZ knows how fragile his country's position has become. He is now trying to develop Emirati “soft power” credentials, much like the Qataris have already done, pouring billions into supporting Egypt’s economy and pushing it to interfere in the Libyan conflict. He has also undertaken more flashy gestures, notably by hosting Syrian Dictator Bashar al-Assad and dismaying Western allies. MBZ wants to get ahead of MBS in Syria as the country gets closer to the end of its bloody civil war. Developing its influence in Damascus would allow the Arab Emirates to counter Iranian influence while also scoring lucrative contracts to help rebuild Syria’s destroyed energy and logistical infrastructure. This would offer the UAE critical access to Mediterranean maritime trade routes and be quite embarrassing to MBS, which has witnessed the Kingdom’s influence in the region disintegrate, most notably in strategic Lebanon, leaving him with no foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. But these efforts have yet to make Abu Dhabi the center of regional diplomacy, with America often preferring to deal with Oman or Jordan as local power brokers due to their avowed neutrality. MBZ’s efforts are impressive in their reach, but they increasingly look like an attempt to maintain leadership and build prestige with no clear direction. The Emirati President is in a race against time to accumulate credentials and make himself indispensable to Western and rich third-world countries to prevent MBS from paying his way to the top. But the two nations are not on a level playing field.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia has still yet to break the cultural and economic hold that Dubai maintains over the Middle East. And while MBS has spending power, he is often restricted on the global stage by his flamboyance and far-reaching authoritarianism that embarrass his Western allies. But MBS’s plan to build a dystopian 500 billion dollar futuristic city spanning a 170 kilometers line in the Saudi desert is not only making global headlines, but foreign companies are increasingly implanting themselves in the Kingdom, and are all eager to be part of the Crown Prince’s Vision 2030 economic plan. The Saudis have built stakes in tech giants and financed mega-infrastructure deals. But Dubai has slipped before. The 2008 economic crisis almost wiped out its vital real estate sector; its economy, while more resilient than ever, still relies on oil subsidies from the wealthier Abu Dhabi emirate. Analysts are watching to see how the looming global financial downturn will affect the Emirate, and if Saudi Arabia will be more resilient. The Kingdom has another advantage over the UAE: its population. Dubai needs another 3 million expatriates to supply its labor market and enable its continued growth. Saudi Arabia has more than 20 million citizens that are increasingly encouraged to leave government jobs for more productive and technical roles. The employment rate amongst women has skyrocketed from 17 to 37%, and social reforms promise to make the country equally as attractive as Dubai in the not-so-distant future. The two leaders will maintain the image of good relations and a symbiotic relationship until Saudi Arabia finally normalizes its relations with Israel and gets more connected to other regional financial and innovation center when the competition between the two countries will then inevitably explode into the open. Will MBZ then still retain the title of most powerful Arab ruler? 

Makram Bekdache is a Sophomore in SEAS, studying Computer Engineering. Makram is passionate about misunderstood and poorly discussed topics in international politics, and making sure everyone knows where Lebanon lies on a map. Makram can be reached at makram.bekdache@columbia.edu.