Imran Khan’s Revolution: Pakistan’s Brightest Hope or Bleakest Danger?

Imran Khan giving a speech to Pakistanis in Peshawar (2007). Photo by Imran Ghazali.

Although Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, it is still far from free for millions who share the dream of democracy. The road to popular democratic rule has been fickle: no Prime Minister in Pakistan’s history has served an entire term. Prime Ministers have either succumbed to official charges of corruption, military coups, or political in-fighting resulting in forced resignations. Imran Khan was elected Prime Minister in August of 2018, after the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, was indicted by the Supreme Court on embezzlement and corruption charges. Khan’s campaign of anti-corruption in 2018 mobilized the youth, with the highest ever voter turnout among first-time voters. Yet, a mere three and a half years later, parliament ousted Khan by a vote of no confidence and installed Nawaz Sharif’s brother as Prime Minister. Khan now embarks on inspiring a revolutionary ‘Long March’ to call for early elections. This November, Khan was shot in the leg by an armed civilian, and many members of his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, were injured and/or killed. Since then, several conspiracies ensued: Khan alleged the U.S.’s involvement in backing his opponents in their attempts to oust him and accused his military and political opponents of an assassination attempt. Relations between Islamabad and Washington—and between the Pakistani military and Khan—soured. For Pakistan’s youth, Khan embodies a shining alternative to Pakistan’s broken system, but his critics labeled him as a ‘right-wing nationalist.’ Is Khan a visionary reformist cultivating meaningful change, or a political agitator rattling the cage to no avail? 

Khan’s critics claim he is playing a losing game, alienating powerful western allies and worsening Pakistan’s already tense relationship with its military. With issues of inflation and climate disasters, critics question if Khan is acting at the right time. However, it can be argued that the losing game is to surrender the people’s will in moments when authentic politics are needed most. Crises of environmental destruction, economic downturn, and civil-military dynamics will not be effectively resolved by politicians concerned with how much they can embezzle without raising suspicion. The placement of Shabaz Sharif as Prime Minister is a clear perpetuation of the dynastic politics that Pakistan has long suffered under. Exchanging the people’s will for a passive and unfettered transition works directly against the principle of self-determination that has been revered as the pinnacle of democracy.

Khan was charged with terrorism this summer for threatening to sue a judge and police officers. Magistrate Ali Javed reported Khan criticizing the inspector-general of police forces and a judge at one of Khan’s rallies; the terrorism charge follows the British-colonial sedition laws. Since the Pakistani judicial and military institutions historically upended their theoretical impartiality to instead influence politics, Khan’s threat to their hold on political power makes retaliation expected. When setting aside even the out-dated colonial law meant to subordinate Pakistanis as British subjects, the employment of the sedition laws to uphold terrorism charges against Khan is a mere reflection of the power structure Khan and young people wish to see removed. When criticism is received as sedition and hyperbolized to terrorism, a reformation is critical; Pakistan’s power system is not a livable one to be accepted with passivity by citizens. Khan is not playing a losing game. He has already reinvigorated a historically politically-apathetic demographic in Pakistan and unveiled the lengths the establishment will go to interrupt opening the political arena. 

Alienation from the West is a consequence of the War on Terror for many Pakistanis, including Khan. The lack of foreign cooperation and the United States’ narrow focus on anti-terrorism, rather than key points like economic partnerships, for conducting foreign policy with Pakistan has left a growing resentment among the Pakistani population. Nationalism has already been stoked within Pakistan against the interference of the west in the War on Terror. During the War on Terror, US-led drone strikes killed nearly 60,000 Pakistanis, including 20,000 civilians, leaving a deeply unpopular opinion of the West. Imran Khan did not rouse anti-west sentiment nor did he invoke ‘right-wing nationalism’. His rhetoric is a product of poor foreign policy coordination between the former Pakistani government and Washington. It is negligent to presume Khan created an anti-western climate in Pakistan when anti-westernism has long inundated the climate of countries from the Middle-East to South Asia harmed by poor collaboration and ineffective targeting from the West.

What remains true, despite all criticisms of Imran Khan, is that he has opened the political realm to Pakistanis who feel disenfranchised by the military-judicial power over civilians. The answer for ‘when is the right timing for a political reform in Pakistan’ remains the same: as soon as possible. A nation self-proclaimed as a democracy all while the military and politicized judiciary stand as its core pillars cannot flourish. When reform is a necessity, it is not a matter of when, but by who. Imran Khan embodies the spirit of the revolutionary force that Pakistan needs to actualize its democracy so it is no longer a futile dream of its people.

Fiza Rizvi (CC ‘24) is a Staff Writer for CPR and is studying computer science. She is interested in foreign policy and national security particularly within the Middle-East and South Asia.